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ABSTRACT
The sites and services approach to urban development in Third World coun-
tries is understood to mean the preparation and subdivision of land for
residential building and the provision of various combinations of public
utilities and community facilities. In recent years the approach has
emerged as a promising method for creating additional urban land suitable
for development by the low-income groups. It has also been seen as
an efficient vehicle for comprehensive community development.
This thesis is a case study of one particular application of the sites
and services strategy in Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya. It relates
the story of the Dandora Community Development Project. The evolution
of the project is traced through several stages of development which led
to its transformation from a comprehensive community development scheme
serving the needs of the low-income groups to a peri-urban housing
estate catering increasingly to the investment needs of Nairobi's
middle class.
An analysis of the outcomes at Dandora reveals the following major
dilemmas which are inherent in the sites and services concept and which
are exacerbated by deficiencies in Kenya's housing policy environment:
prices versus standards, subsidies versus replicability; wage employment
versus self-help labor; middle-class beneficiaries versus low-income
beneficiaries; and sponsor control versus participant freedom.
Dandora has provided benefits to allottees not only in the form of shelter
but also in the form of additional income through rents and plot sales.
This suggests that sites and services have an important role as an
instrument for income redistribution.
On balance Dandora exhibits more in common with past Kenyan housing poli-
cies and less as a radical new attempt to meet the urban service needs
of the poor. Recommendations are made to provide project participants
with greater choice of options in future projects both in respect of
housing and non-housing services.
Thesis Advisor: Alcira Kreimer, PhD
Assistant Professor
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Background
The rapid rate of urbanization occurring in the developing countries is by
now a well-documented phenomenon. In 1975 it was forecast that by the
year 2000 1.3 billion inhabitants will be added to their urban popula-
tions.(1) This accounts for approximately two thirds of the total anti-
cipated increase in population and represents a tripling in size of the
current urban populace. In most of the affected cities, the provision
of urban infrastructure in the form of roads, sewers, water, electricity
and community facilities has lagged behind city growth. The result has
been a shortage of serviced land which is properly integrated into the
urban fabric in terms of use and infrastructure.
The site and services approach to urban development in Third World
countries has been seen as an efficient way to create this needed urban
land. The concept is understood to mean
"the preparation and subdivision of land for residential buildings
and the provision of various combinations of public utilities and
community facilities."(2)
Typically, the construction of dwellings is carried out by the plot
holders using self-help methods. The concept can apply to both raw land
and existing residential settlements. It is seen as having particular
potential for serving the needs of low-income groups.
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In 1972 a global survey revealed that 23 countries had prepared over
770,000 new serviced plots for occupancy by low-income urban residents
since the mid-1950s.(3) Since 1972, an additional 148,000 plots in 15
countries have been the subject of loan agreements with the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) as part of multisectoral
community development projects (refer to Table 1.1).(4) IBRD loans for
a further 48 projects are schedules for negotiation before 1981. It
would thus appear that the notion of sites and services is gaining
increasing acceptance throughout the world as a way to create additional
urbanized land in Third World countries.
Kenya is one of these countries and is representative of a number
of sub-Saharan African nations whose proportion of urban population is
low (11.3%), but whose cities are growing at double the rate of natural
population growth (4.9%).(5) Faced with median per capita urban incomes
of less than $200 per year and a growing proportion of urban residents,
Kenya has turned to the sites and services approach as part of its
strategy for urbanization. The National Development Plan for 1974-1978
called for the allocation of $72 million by the central Government for
sites and services.(6) This represented 32% of the total government
allocation for all types of publicly funded urban housing and was ear-
marked for 72,000 plots to be located in the 36 largest urban centers.
Currently, efforts are being made to strengthen the institutional mech-
anisms for implementing the program and significant amounts of interna-
tional capital are being obtained to finance the development costs of the
work.
Thus the sites and services strategy now occupies an expanding niche
in Kenya's national urbanization policy. Moreover, on the basis of the
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evidence presented in Table 1.1, it is clear that the approach has
secured an equal if not greater foothold in the national urbanization
policies of a number of other countries.
Purpose and Scope of the Thesis
There are a number of hypotheses underlying the use of the sites and
services approach as a way to cater for the needs of the urban poor.
First, it is hypothesised that sites and services provide a way of
giving government a method of controlling the spatial development of
urban centers by channelling self-help housing efforts onto appropriately
located and serviced land. Second, it is assumed that limited resources
will not permit governments to solve "the housing problem" in any more
substantive way. Sites and services are thus claimed to be a "second
best solution" to the problem of providing shelter, especially to the
urban poor.(7) Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it is claimed that
sites and services improve the life-prospects of project participants,
particularly those in the low-income groups, by giving them access to the
resources, services, and opportunities offered by the urban system.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the- validity of the above
hypotheses in the case of Kenya. More specifically, it is intended to
1) define the concept of sites and services as applied to new residential
settlements; 2) outline the relevant social, economic, and political
characteristics of the Kenyan context within which the concept is being
applied; 3) describe in detail one particular application of the approach
in Kenya; and 4) evaluate the extent to which the Kenyan experience
validates the claims made for the approach. The study attempts to deal
with the following topics:
Table 1.1
Summary of Global Survey of Sites and Services
Number of plots Number of new
prepared before plots assisted by
Country 1972 IBRD since 1972
Bolivia - 5,525
Botswana - 1,800
Burma 40,000 -
Cameroon 4,200 -
Chile 180,000 -
Colombia 12,000 -
El Salvador - 15,000
Guatemala - 10,000
India 110,000 26,200
Iraq 100,000 -
Indonesia - 7,930
Ivory Coast 8,250
Jamaica - 4,000
Kenya 3,000 6,000*
Korea 6,600 1,900
Malawi 7,500 -
Morocco 10,750 -
Nicaragua - 6,400
Pakistan 150,000 -
Panama 1,500 -
Philippines - 3,300
Puerto Rico 11,600 -
Senegal 15,000 16,000
Sudan 13,000 -
Tanzania 521 29,600
Thailand 4,450 -
Tunisia 14,000 -
Turkey 50,000 -
Venezuela 20,000 -
Zambia 18,500 4,400
TOTAL 772,621 146,305
Sources: Merrill and Grindley,
Attachment 1.
1973, p.8 and IBRD, 1977,
* Dandora Community Development Project
1) The theoretical basis on which the sites and services concept is
founded;
- what assumptions does it make about the process of urbanization
in Kenya as it is presently understood?
- what are the contradictions built into the approach as currently
defined?
2) The various elements of the sites and services strategy as prac-
ticed in Kenya are;
- what components make up the sites and services strategy?
- what is the nature of the relationship between the program spon-
sors and the program participants?
- what role have international development agencies played in shaping
Kenya's strategy?
3) The nature of Kenya's urban situation within which the concept is
being applied;
- what are the socio-economic characteristics of the country's
urban population?
- what is the existing institutional framework which caters for
Kenya's urban growth?
- what national and local policies have been adopted to deal with
expanding urban centers?
4) The ability of the sites and services strategy to meet the needs of
the low-income groups;
- what has been the impact of the strategy on the perceived need
for low-income housing in Kenya's urban areas?
- to what extent do sites and services provide opportunities to
use self-help methods of building construction?
- have sites and services projects succeeded in promoting compre-
hensive community development for the urban poor?
- to what extent have sites and services projects created employment
opportunities for the low-income groups?
5) The conditions under which a strategy of sites and services is most
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likely to succeed;
- what are the political, economic, social and technical constraints
which hinder the implementation of the strategy?
- what sub-groups of the housing market are best served by
the strategy?
- what kind of housing policy environment is required to support a
strategy of sites and services?
- what role do sites and services have in developing new urban
communities?
6) The future prospects for Kenya's sites and services strategy;
- what changes are required in order to make the strategy better
serve the needs of the low-income group?
Research Method
As a result of Kenya's use of the sites and services concept since the
early 1960s, there exists a considerable body of literature on the sub-
ject. This literature is made up of not only government statements but
also a number of evaluation surveys (Houlberg et al., 1971; Merrill,
1975) and academic theses (Chana, 1974, 1975; Temple, 1973). However,
there has been a tendency to treat the subject at a relatively high
level of generality or from a particular disciplinary point of view such
as architecture or political science. Moreover, none of the work pub-
lished to date has involved the preparation of a case study of a single
project with sufficient detail to illustrate some of the more complex
aspects of planning and implementing what may appear to be a straight-
forward urbanization policy. This thesis is an attempt to correct that
deficiency by undertaking a detailed study of one particular application
of the sites and services strategy in Kenya.
The case study focuses on the Dandora Community Development Project
located in the nation's capitol city, Nairobi. Dandora is a multiphased
6
sites and services scheme consisting of 6,000 plots and related community
facilities. It is located on a tract of previously vacant land approxi-
mately eleven kilometers north east of the city center (refer to Figure
1.1). The project is being implemented by the Nairobi City Council (NCC)
under the close supervision of the central Government. At the time of
writing (winter 1977/78) the first 1,000 plots have been completed and
occupied. The remaining 5,000 plots, divided into two additional phases,
are in the final design stage. The implementation of the project has
been accompanied by considerable political controversy. The planning,
design, and management of the scheme embody many notions of urban develop-
ment which run counter to the sentiments of diverse interest groups in
the country. Questions about appropriate environmental standards, rele-
vant allocation criteria and the like generated much debate among both
policy makers and ordinary citizens.
The Dandora Project was selected for study for the following reasons.
Firstly, the size of the scheme, its location in Nairobi and the politi-
cal controversy surrounding its implementation have caused virtually
every segment of Kenyan society to make known their opinions of the
project. It is thus a particularly rich episode in Kenyan housing
history and crystallizes the major issues underlying the sites and
services concept as applied in Kenya. Secondly the project is being
sponsored by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD). As such, it is one of a growing number of such projects which
are coming under the formative influence of this important international
lending agency (refer to Table 1.1).
The case study draws on information gathered in 1976 when the author
was engaged as an architect on the design of the second and third phases
7
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of the project. Note that neither of these phases have been constructed
yet and so they do not form part of the analysis. This experience pre-
sented the opportunity to be a "participant observer" and watch part of
the process unfold. The study also incorporates data collected in
Nairobi in the summer of 1977. This period of field research included
interviews with policy makers in central and local Governments, profes-
sional consultants, IBRD staff, building contractors, university research
personnel and project residents. Data was collected from unpublished
records kept by the Ministry of Housing and Social Services, the Ministry
of Lands and Settlements, the National Housing Corporation, the Housing
Research and Development Unit of the University of Nairobi and the
Nairobi City Council. These sources included particularly valuable
data collected by the Dandora Monitoring and Evaluation Study funded
jointly by the Kenya Government and the IBRD. Information was also
obtained from published sources such as annual reports of the relevant
institutions and local and international newspapers. Direct field
observations also yielded valuable information on the nature of the
Dandora Project.
Organization of the Thesis
The next chapter briefly reviews the origins of the theoretical basis
of the concept of sites and services. It describes the shift in perspec-
tive taken of uncontrolled urban growth from that of a pathological
process to one of an inevitable manifestation of rapid urban growth
containing much of the energy and resources needed for its own consoli-
dation. The concept of sites and services is defined and an attempt is
made to identify its physical, financial, and administrative components.
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Chapter 3 examines Kenya's urban situation, dominated as it is by its
capitol, Nairobi, and its port city, Mombasa. The important character-
istics of the country's urbanization process are identified. The salient
points of the national social, economic and political systems are
described to provide the relevant background against which to view the
unfolding of the Dandora Project.
Chapter 4 recounts what happened when the concept of sites and
services as defined in Chapter 2 was applied to the real world as out-
lined briefly in Chapter 3. The evolution of the Dandora Project is
traced through five different stages of development: definition,
preparation, appraisal, implementation and occupation. During the
process particular issues surfaced, often more than once, and became
the subject of debate by actors who represented diverse interests, both
Kenyan and international. The manner in which the forces were brought
to bear and the issues resolved (or not resolved) conditioned the
outcomes of Dandora. Chapter 5 describes these outcomes as observed in
December 1977. The observations depict the "state of the system" one
year after the first 1,000 plots were occupied. They provide a prelimi-
nary indication of the extent to which Dandora has achieved its goals.
Chapter 6 attempts to account for the observed outcomes and explores
the relationships between them. The concept of sites and services is
analyzed in terms of the contradictions inherent in the approach.
Certain shortcomings in Kenya's political, social and economic systems
are identified as contributing to the policy dilemmas facing Kenya's
urban planners. The last chapter discusses the implications of the
Dandora experience for future urbanization projects. Recommendations are
made for modifying the strategy to better serve the needs of Kenya's
low-income population. 10
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Chapter 2
Sites and Services Defined
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to define in some detail the nature of
the sites and services approach to low-income housing. An attempt is
made to link the origins of the contemporary definition of the concept
to a fundamental change in planners' perspective of the urbanization
process which occurred in the mid 1960's. This perspective, viewing the
problem of squatter settlements as containing the seeds of its own
solution, suggests a number of broad principles or policy assumptions
which must condition government response to the housing problem in
developing countries. The various physical, financial and administra-
tive components of the sites and services approach are described with
attention paid to how they meet the policy assumptions. The result is
a strategy which claims to meet the housing needs of the low-income and
which therefore has decided advantages over both conventional public
housing and equally conventional squatter settlements. A final section
outlines some of the criticisms which have been made of sites and
services projects.
The Changing Perspective of Urbanization
The origins of the contemporary concept of sites and services has grown
out of a new perspective of the urbanization process. Most planners
have come to realize that the urban situation of many developing coun-
tries poses the following constraints on solutions to providing a proper
dwelling environment for the low-income groups:
"a. Rapid urban population growth which is not mitigated by poli-
cies of rural development;
b. the inability of government to suppress the development of
squatter settlements in urban areas through the use of police
powers such as zoning, eviction or demolition;
c. the inadequacy of government resources to provide every family
with a permanent suitable house; and
d. the inability of improved housing technology to solve the
housing problem by itself."(1)
It is useful to summarize how these changes in perspective came about.
The classical view of urbanization did not distinguish between
squatter settlements, often located on the periphery of cities, and
inner city slums. Both types of settlement were seen as pathological
aberrations in the urban setting. In both cases housing was seen as a
physical commodity whose quality was capable of being evaluated accor-
ding to definitive standards. The solution proposed for solving the
housing crisis was simply the eradication of substandard dwellings and
their replacement with publicly funded decent housing. This view was
the dominant perspective in many developing countries and to a great
extent still is. A typical official statement to this effect is the
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oft-quoted resolution by the Indian Town Planning Institute in 1955.
"The basic standards in housing and planning are arrived at not
only from consideration of cost but also from considerations of
creating the desirable sociological and physical environment
necessary for the healthy growth of individuals and the commu-
nity.....The standards cannot be lowered, whatever be the
community.....Substandard housing is but a step towards slums." (2)
In the early 1960's there emerged a different view which developed
partly in response to the failure of the urban renewal formula in
Western countries. This view accepted the inevitability of uncontrolled
urban settlements. More sophisticated analyses of the urban process
revealed many types of urban slums which were substantially different
in social and economic character from the many types of peripheral
squatter settlements (3). Already it was being realized that the con-
ventional urban renewal strategies were beyond the financial and human
resources possessed by most governments. Moreover, whenever urban
renewal was carried out the beneficiaries turned out not to be the low-
income groups but the better off who could afford the price of improved
urban services. In addition, the social costs of urban "removal"
exacted its price from those residents forced to relocate far from
their places of employment (4).
Attention turned to the possibilities of government organized and
assisted "self-help" approaches to urban housing. Experiments were
carried out along these lines in Puerto Rico (1958) and Colombia
(1960). A review of such schemes by Charles Abrams stated:
"Where the aim is not primarily the training of workers, it is
preferable for the government to lay out and provide lots and
utilities and let each owner decide whether to use his own
skills or to hire others for all, most or part of the work."(5)
He also described the phenomenon of "installment construction" whereby
a family constructs its dwelling progressively as funds allow:
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"Installment building is the only way many families without savings
can get their house built.....The installment builder needs finan-
cing to help him complete his building, and often a small loan
will be sufficient. But not enough attention has been paid to
this aspect of the housing problem."(6)
Here we see the beginnings of the sites and service concept as a
basis for a formal instrument of public policy. It was articulated
in a very pragmatic way by Abrams on the basis of perceptive field
observation. He offered it, albeit with some reservations about the
efficacy of self-help labor, as a possible way to shelter the urban
poor.
Similar observations by John Turner in Peru led to his formulation
of a theory which attempted to explain the nature of what he called
autonomous urban settlements. In 1966 he prepared an influential paper
entitled "Uncontrolled Urban Settlement: Problems and Policies" for
a United Nations Interregional Seminar on Development Policies and
Planning in Relation to Urbanization. In this paper he outlined a
number of hypotheses concerning the nature of squatter settlements and
the process by which they are formed.
His first hypothesis reversed the traditional notion that uncon-
trolled urban growth was a pathological phenomenon. By postulating a
distinction between "problems of planlessness or anarchy and of
'shantytown' slum conditions," he proposed that:
"Uncontrolled urban settlement is a manifestation of normal
urban growth processes under the exceptional conditions of
rapid urbanization."(7)
From this he drew a second hypothesis:
"Autonomous urban settlements are both the product of and
vehicle for activities which are essential to the process
of modernization."(8)
A third hypothesis is based on the assumption that the values and
priorities of the popular sector of the urban population are different
from those that they are required to adopt by society's institutions:
"Autonomous urban settlement (in the major cities of urbanizing
nations) is the product of the difference between the nature of
popular demand for dwellings and those supplied by institution-
alized society."(9)
It was asserted that employment was a priority amongst the urban poor,
second only to the need for water, and that housing was much lower on
the list than planners had previously supposed. Turner argues that:
"The institutional control of urban settlements depends on the
encouragement and support of popular initiative through the
government servicing of local resources.....Therefore govern-
ments, especially those that do not possess or control resources
needed for environmental development, should not attempt to
substitute for local action but they should support it."(10)
Squatter settlements were "viewed as solutions to difficult social
problems rather than as problems in themselves."(ll) Rather than
build houses, government should create the capacity of the low-income
groups to house themselves. Turner suggested that:
"in order to make the best use of scarce housing resources.....
each household must have an adequate choice of alternative
locations, of alternative forms of tenure and, of course,
of alternative structures and ways of building and using
them."(12)
Since 1966 Turner has elaborated his thesis and has embraced the
notion of housing as an activity"that can act as a vehicle for personal
fulfillment."(13) That is, housing is seen more as a process, "a verb"
and not so much as a commodity or "noun". This conceptual leap dis-
tinguishes Turner and his advocates from his more pragmatic predecessors
such as Abrams.
Since the mid-1960's, much field research has been carried out in
various countries with a view to testing Turner's hypotheses. Much of
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this work has been done in Latin America: Leeds, 1973, Perlman, 1975
in Brazil; Collier, 1974, in Peru; Ward, 1976, and Sudra, 1975, in
Mexico; and Portes, 1974, in Chile. There are a number of studies in
Asia and Africa as well: Laquian, 1968, in the Philippines; Etherton,
1971, in Kenya.
The Turner approach to housing the low-income groups suggests a
number of principles which should govern the planning, design and
management of strategies for dealing with the problem. It is to
these principles that we next turn.
Principles for a New Approach
The altered perception of urbanization outlined above suggests that
any appropriate and replicable strategy for providing suitable dwelling
environments for the low-income groups in developing countries must
rely on the following basic principles:
First, a successful strategy must necessarily provide what Van
Huyck calls "channels of upward mobility."(14) This requires:
a) Treating the total neighborhood as the unit of concern since
housing per se is not the problem of first priority for the urban poor.
b) Guaranteeing an adequate mixture of income-producing opportu-
nities for all members of the family. This requires allowing income-
earning activities to take place within the dwelling environment.
c) Applying the strategy in areas of existing employment opportu-
nities and urban services. Where this is impossible, the creation of
jobs and services must accompany the development of new dwelling
environments.
d) Ensuring the provision of suitable housing services for those
urban poor who cannot afford to own a dwelling.
The second principle recognizes the inadequacy of government
resources to house the whole population. Hence, the strategy must, of
necessity, mobilize private resources, both human and financial. This
can be achieved by:
a) Ensuring that the benefits of the strategy are perceived by the
participants as being worth paying for. That is, there must be value
for money.
b) Ensuring that the costs per family do not exceed the amount
families pay for housing in the absence of the strategy.
c) Guaranteeing the security of tenure of the dwelling environment
to encourage its development by the participants.
d) Stimulating investment in the dwelling environment by providing
families with appropriate types of credit.
Thirdly, a corollary to the second principle indicates that not
only must the strategy mobilize private resources, but it must also be
self-financing. That is, any costs not covered by private financial
resources must be capable of payment by the sponsor on the scale of a
large continuing program. This can be achieved by:
a) Selecting participants on the basis of their ability to pay for
housing rather than on the basis of their need. In other words, the
housing services provided must be affordable by the low-income groups.
b) Ensuring that there is an effective system for collecting the
payments owed by the participants.
c) Gearing any improvements to public services, community facilities
and housing to the effective demand of the participant population.
A fourth principle calls for the successful strategy to be
applicable on a massive scale such that, in the long run, the supply of
low-income housing will expand with a concomitant reduction in its
market price. A necessary step to take in this regard is the preserva-
tion of the existing housing stock so that each new dwelling represents
a net increase in the number of houses available to the low-income
groups. This suggests the halting of demolition of existing squatter
areas.
A fifth and final principle, called "the principle of self-government
in housing" by Turner in his most recent writing, calls for the separa-
tion of:
"personal and local activities and their immediate ends from those
that are necessarily standardized at supra-local levels."(15)
This principle gives the most direct clue to the fundamental nature of
the sites and services approach.
In essence, the sites and services principle allows low-income
residents to continue to use their resources to provide their own
dwelling environment but in a physical setting that avoids the squalor
associated with uncontrolled urban settlements. This principle of self-
government in housing follows from the hypothesis that all activities
connected with building and maintaining a dwelling environment can be
divided into two sets. One set includes all those activities that are
best carried out by a centralized organization on a "one-shot" instant
development basis, e.g. the provision of physical infrastructure such
as roads, sewers, etc. The other set of activities includes all those
tasks that are best carried out by decentralized, autonomous, small-
scale units on a progressive basis, e.g. building and maintaining
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individual dwellings. What distinguishes sites and services from other
more conventional methods of housing is the location of the dividing
line between the two sets of activities so as to minimize the per capita
investment of the sponsor and to maximize the contribution of the
participants.
Sites and Services: A Definition
Turner has defined sites and services programs as follows:
"Sites and services programs are publicly sponsored subdivisions
providing building lots and (generally minimal) services or
utilities for low-income owner-builders."(16)
The term is customarily applied to a wide range of projects, including:
"Raw land, subdivided into plots, with a common water tap serving
a number of plots, common latrines, and unpaved streets.
"Plots, each serviced by a water tap and with its own latrine,
septic tank or sewer connection.
"Plots, each serviced as above and with a small outbuilding con-
taining the core facilities.
"Plots, each serviced and with a partly finished house, which
could be a plinth, a plinth with supports and roof, or one
complete room upon which additions can be made."(17)
Given this variety, it is appropriate to identify those elements of
the approach which are essential components and those which are
variable or optional. The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) defines the following elements as essential:
a) building plots for dwellings
b) water supply
c) waste disposal
d) access ways
e) street lighting
f) surface water drainage (18)
The last five items are often referred to as urban infrastructure or
"on-site" infrastructure. The IBRD defines the following components as
variable, meaning they may be excluded only if similar services are
already being provided within the project region at levels sufficient
to meet the project's needs:
a) social services such as health centers, schools, community
centers, police posts and recreation areas. These services are nor-
mally provIded by the sponsor of the project.
b) sites for industrial and commercial activities such as markets
and workshops for light industry. These sites are normally developed by
private interests.
c) primary, trunk or "off-site" infrastructure required to link the
project site with the city-wide service networks, viz., roads, sewers,
water, electricity.
d) transportation services such as local buses.
Finally, the IBRD defines the following elements as optional, meaning
their exclusion should not render the strategy ineffective:
a) core units on the building plots, consisting of rudimentary
sanitary and washing facilities or part of a habitable room.
b) financial credit to the occupants of the project to facilitate
dwelling construction or the expansion of employment opportunities.
c) technical assistance both at the level of managing the project
and at the level of building individual dwellings.
By taking a more "process-oriented" view of the sites and services
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approach, one can appreciate the importance of a well-developed manage-
ment system required to organize the efforts of the project sponsor to
ensure that they mesh with those of the participants and vice versa.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the conventional relationships between the major
tasks which have to be carried out by the sponsor to provide the physi-
cal, social and economic environment conducive to self-help or
self-managed community development. The diagram in Figure 2.1 can be
examined in four interconnected parts, each one dealing with a different
set of tasks:
- identifying potential project participants
- planning, designing, and constructing the project infrastructure
- matching participants to the infrastructure
- supporting the participants development of the community
Let us examine each set in turn. Identifying potential project parti-
cipants has been described as an exercise in "market analysis".(19)
Conventionally, socio-economic surveys are carried out to identify the
population group which cannot afford housing in the private market but
who nonetheless want to own a house in an urban setting. A "target
population" is defined within this group by means of allocation criteria
which describe the required characteristics of need, and ability and
willingness to pay. The sponsor requests applications for plots from
the target group and these are reviewed for eligibility on the basis of
the allocation criteria. Ineligible applications are rejected and
eligible ones are retained for inclusion in the process of plot allo-
cation.
The planning, design and construction of the project infrastructure
is contingent upon the identification of the target population since
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project components and physical planning standards are determined
primarily on the basis of the projects overall ability to pay for
itself. Suitably located sites are identified and selected based on,
inter alia, proximity to employment centers, topography and acquisition
costs. Physical and financial plans are drawn up while the land is
being acquired and surveyed. After the relevant procurement procedures
have been completed (e.g., international tenders for internationally
financed projects) the urban infrastructure is put into place. In
addition, the social services provided by the sponsor are established
and the sites are prepared for residential, commercial and industrial
activities to be initiated by private resources.
The serviced sites are allocated to eligible applicants (either
as individuals or as groups) in a process which matches needs with
available infrastructure. Where demand for plots exceeds the supply,
a method of impartial participant selection is required. Ballotting
techniques which randomly assign applicants to the plot type of their
choice are sometimes used. Formal legal agreements are concluded
between sponsor and participants. The conditions of lease, rental
or sale reiterate the principles of the allocation criteria. Grounds
for eviction (where applicable) are spelled out.
The tasks so far described are discrete in that they are normally
carried out only once for each project. The final group of tasks which
provide support for the private development of the community are more
continuous in nature. Essentially they provide technical, financial
and community organizing services designed to facilitate the processes
of physical, economic and social development. Technical services often
include on-site assistance to plot holders building their dwellings. It
24
can involve the preparation of type-design plans for dwellings, shops
and other small structures. Another common element in a technical
assistance program is training of participants in basic construction
skills. Financial services include the provision of credit for material
or construction loans and the collection of monthly payments from plot
holders. Often the administration of credit is linked to programs of
technical assistance whereby standards of construction are monitored to
ensure that buildings last at least as long as the repayment period.
Community development services have a role to play in encouraging the
formation of building groups and other forms of mutual help organiza-
tions. In addition, group organization has been seen to be an important
factor in maintaining a regular pattern of loan repayments. Where
financial default does occur, project sponsors are considered negligent
if they do not evict the party concerned and, upon payment of compensa-
tion to the former owner, reallocate the plot to another eligible
applicant.
A final continuous process which embeds the whole array of tasks
illustrated in Figure 2.1 is the process of monitoring and evaluation,
designed to provide sponsors and participants alike with opportunities
for mid-course corrections. In the long run, results from monitoring
and evaluation studies are used to improve the preparation and imple-
mentation of future projects.
The diagram in Figure 2.1 has been drawn to reflect the fact that
in recent years sites and services have been seen as an effective way
to promote multi-sectoral community development. The success of a sites
and services project must be measured in terms of its ability to meet
all the needs of the predefined participant population, not simply
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the housing need.
Advantages of the Sites and Services Approach
A review of the literature suggests that preparing new tracts of urban-
ized land in convenient locations with basic supporting services can
have numerous advantages over conventional housing strategies, especi-
ally with regard to the low-income groups (Van Huyck, 1971; Merrill and
Grindley, 1973; World Bank, 1974; Grimes, 1976; Matheka, 1976; Burns
and Grebler, 1977). A synthesized list of these advantages is given.
Sites and services provided dwelling environments at minimal
financial cost. This economic efficiency is achieved in two ways.
First, it is accomplished by granting increased scope for self-help
construction of dwellings which stimulates non-monetary savings. That
is, savings are mobilized directly in kind ("sweat equity") rather than
through financial intermediaries. Savings and investment occur simul-
taneously in a process that utilizes resources that would otherwise
remain untapped. Second, costs are minimized by achieving economies
of scale by installing urban infrastructure over larger areas than can
be covered by more expensive public housing projects.
As a consequence, sites and services are affordable by the low-income
groups. Low unit costs mean that sites and services can bring about a
more equitable expenditure of government funds. What little resources
there are can be spread over many more people. This achieves more
horizontal equity (among all low-income groups) and more vertical equity
(between the rich and the poor). As a result of this equity, finances
may be more readily available from external financing agencies for sites
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and services than for other types of housing expenditures which favor
middle and high income groups. By spreading a smaller investment per
unit over many more households, sites and services can lower the invest-
ment risk. In other words, sites and services projects are bankable
projects, from the point of view of the sponsors. Affordability and
bankability contribute to making a strategy of sites and services a
replicable strategy. If schemes are designed to be within the occupants'
capacity to pay, there will be little or no element of net subsidy and
hence projects will be self-liquidating. Replicability is a necessary
criterion if the strategy is to have any long-term impact on the problem
of providing the low-income with access to urban services. Replicability
facilitates the massive application of the concept with beneficial
effects on the stability of the low-income rental housing market.
Sites and services are applicable to all income groups, not only
the poor. The approach can therefore be used to encourage the spatial
integration of different income groups by creating community develop-
ments catering for a variety of economic interests. There need be no
ghettoes for the urban poor.
The sites and services strategy is an adaptable approach to public
intervention in meeting the residential needs of the low-income groups.
Schemes can be designed to provide different kinds and levels of ser-
vices at different times in accordance with people's needs. It also
can adapt to local market conditions, thus maximizing the use of local
resources.
Catering for occupants' priorities gives them more control over the
method and speed of construction of their dwelling. This form of
consumer sovereignty helps foster a sense of self-reliance. This in
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turn will encourage the generation of more non-monetary savings through
self-help employment.
Transferring the decisions concerning investment in private
dwellings to the occupant households makes sites and services projects
administratively simpler than conventional housing projects.
A review of the same literature reveals that sites and services
have many advantages over traditional squatter settlements. Sites and
services projects provide a more habitable dwelling environment with at
least minimal urban services. The provision of minimal services in an
organized layout provides greater opportunities for subsequent upgrading.
Sites and services schemes are thus improvable at lower costs than
squatter settlements.
The implementation of sites and services schemes increases the
likelihood of creating efficient new townships within more efficient
urban development patterns. They impose a restraint on the growth of
unplanned squatter settlements. They provide local authorities with
a controlled development within their areas of jurisdiction.
The provision of security of tenure creates homeownership. This
fosters a sense of dignity and belonging which can form the basis for
community development. It creates the incentive for personal investment
in the family dwelling.
Finally, sites and services projects stimulate the local economy
by triggering a multiplier effect associated with the expenditure on
goods and services required to construct dwellings. The provision of
credit in the form of material or construction loans is a major con-
tributor to this effect.
Disadvantages of Sites and Services
The criticisms of sites and services found in the literature emanate
from a broad spectrum of ideological persuasions, ranging from the
liberal reformist to the extreme radical (Turner, 1977; Peattie and
Doebele, 1976; A.C. Lewin, 1976; Merrill and Grindley, 1973; Cooper
and Lybrand, 1977; Hans Harms, 1976; Diego Robles Rivas, 1974; S.T.
Roweis, 1972). The criticisms can be grouped under five different
headings.
First, sites and services are alleged to have adverse impacts on
the spatial distribution of the urban population. The mechanisms by
which the participants are selected is criticized for inducing a
"creaming effect" on the population. Where selection is based primarily
on the ability of participants to pay for their housing, it is believed
that society runs the risk of being stratified by income group. The
poor are segregated from the rich in ways which rupture the economic
linkages between social classes. More extreme critics have argued that
by attracting the better-off and more organized residents from squatter
settlements, the latter are left weakened and are therefore more prone
to economic and social stagnation. In addition, sites and services are
charged with relegating the poor to the periphery of cities where large
parcels of land are cheaper and more easily available than in the city
centers.
Second, sites and services projects are sometimes criticized for
their undesirable effect on the spatial distribution of wealth both
within and between regions. Intra-regional disparities are exacerbated
when the benefits do not accrue to the low-income groups. In the past,
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schemes have been penetrated by the middle class which gains control
over land, capital and other construction inputs, including technical
assistance. In some cases, projects have been too expensive for the
low-income. In such cases, the aim for no subsidy has been termed
unrealistic. Inter-regional disparities can be accentuated if projects
attract migrants and capital from the rural areas.
A third category of criticism objects to the effects which sites
and services projects have on urban form. Schemes have been condemned
for being too large, too low density and too slow to consolidate into
aesthetically pleasing pieces of urban real estate. As a result, they
have been called "planned slums". Where they induce rural-urban
migration, they are blamed for accelerating the growth of squatter
settlements.
Fourth, a number of operational weaknesses are cited. Projects
have been criticized for their lack of administrative finesse. Where.
professional salaries are up to ten times those of project participants,
project administration is judged too expensive. The limited availa-
bility of technical assistance and community organizing skills restricts
the feasibility to undertake large projects. If projects are large,
they tend to create administrative, planning and co-ordination problems
amongst inexperienced personnel. Projects are criticized for not having
the training element needed to create the administrative and technical
skills required to replicate the strategy. Where municipal revenues
are low and community organization is weak, project maintenance is
alleged to be poor. Inadequate collection mechanisms lead to massive
defaulting on monthly payments. Even Turner himself has criticized
sites and services for providing too limited a choice of services to the
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consumer/participant. He fears that sites and services programs:
"may prove to be effective instruments in the hands of
oppressive governments, unless.....the consequently
increased focus on the social use of finance, land and
infrastructure leads out of the categorical program
syndrome - the assumption that the problem is to provide
categories of people with classified bundles of housing
goods and services."(20)
The desire for administrative simplicity and control tends to reduce
the variety of available services and consequently projects do not meet
the priorities of the low-income groups.
A final category of criticism, the most radical, objects to sites
and services and the associated concept of self-help on the grounds that
they perpetuate the existing social structure of society and hence are
socially unjust and exploitive. The unequal application of policies
governing plot sales and subletting, for example, create one law for
the rich and one for the poor. Individual and mutual self-help efforts
to construct dwellings are criticized for effectively subsidizing those
income groups who do get full housing services from the government.
Moreover, Rivas, speaking in the context of Peruvian squatter settle-
ments, has objected to the use of self-help which is oriented only
towards increased welfare and not "towards the (participants') basic
interests such as increased income levels, opportunity for stable
occupation and active participation in the urban productive struc-
ture."(21) The sites and services strategy, by accepting as given the
existing pattern of control over the means of production, treat only
the symptoms of rapid urbanization and not its causes. Roweis finds
the proponents of the theory behind sites and services guilty of
"advocating the goodness of the very system (capitalist market economy)
which generates and reproduces the problems they set out to solve."(22)
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Before going on to examine the case of hte Dandora Community
Development Project in Nairobi, let us first outline the basic features
of Kenya's urban situation. This is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Urbanization in Kenya
Introduction
There is a large and growing body of historical and social science
literature on low-income urban settlements in Kenya (Stren, 1976;
Wachtel, Janmohamed, Memon, and Wachtel, 1974). This literature indi-
cates that Kenya has much in common with other black African countries,
especially those with a British colonial heritage. These common
features include the relative absence of urbanization before the
colonial era, the development of urban system dominated by a single
city and geared to the efficient production and exportation of commodi-
ties to larger world markets, a high rate of population growth, a low
rate of urbanization, and strong similarities between colonial and
present day policies of capitalist economic development. It is beyond
the scope of this chapter to review this literature in detail. Rather,
the salient points of Kenya's political, social and economic systems
will be described to provide the relevant background against which to
view the unfolding of the Dandora Community Development Project. Some
of the major socio-economic characteristics of Kenya's urban population
are outlined to illustrate the nature of the demand for urban services,
particularly housing. The country's urban development policies are
breifly discussed to indicate the intended role of sites and services
as a strategy for meeting these demands. Where possible, the descrip-
tion will focus on the situation in Nairobi, the location of the
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Dandora Project.
Major Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Urban Poor
There has been no official attempt to define exactly what income groups
constitute the low-income group in Kenya. Conventionally, the urban
poor have been defined as the lowest 40% of the urban population when
ranked according to household'income.(1) Accurate income distribution
data are notoriously difficult to acquire and any interpretations based
on them must be made with caution. The plethora of income distribution
studies carried out in Kenya over the last ten years has suffered from
a number of methodological and sampling weaknesses (Household Budget
Surveys, 1968, 1969; International Labour Organization, 1972; Nairobi
Urban Study Group, 1973; Nelle Temple, 1972; F.T. Temple, 1973; Cooper
& Lybrand, 1977; Hoek-Smit, 1977). These shortcomings have led to
the underrepresentation of the extremes of the income distribution curve
with consequent errors in the income limits which define each quintile.
With this caveat in mind, Table 3.1 is presented to illustrate the
pattern of income distribution as estimated for Nairobi in 1970. A
reformulation of this table by quintile reveals that the poorest 40%
of Nairobi's households earns just over 10% of the city's household
income, with no family in the lower middle quintile earning more than
Ksh 450 ($54) per month.(2)
One of the most important characteristics of the pre-Independence
urban population was the propensity for African workers to engage in a
pattern of circular migration, that is, temporary migration to an area
for work, following which the worker returns home. This unstable form
of labor supply was induced by the enforced separation of the workplace
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Table 3.1 Nairobi Household Income Distribution (1970)
Reported Households
Household
Income Cum
Ksh per month Numbers %
0-160 11,841 9.4 9.4
161-340 20,417 16.1 25.5
341-500 23,799 18.8 44.3
501-1000 24,580 19.4 63.7
1001-1500 15,338 12.5 76.2
1501-2000 11,586 9.2 85.4
2001-4000 9,384 7.4 92.8
4001-6000 4,006 3.2 96.0
6001+ 5,022 4.0 100.0
Source: Nairobi Metropolitan Growth Strategy, Vol. II, 1973,
Table 4.5
Note: This information is given in graph form in Figure 5.1.
from the home by colonial laws associated with the native 'reserves'
the lack of family accommodation in urban areas, and the need for
Africans to participate in the wage economy if only to save sufficient
money to pay the compulsory hut tax levied by the colonial regime. Two
other factors cited are the relatively low opportunity cost of leaving
urban employment and the high opportunity cost of abandoning what small
yields could be obtained from whatever land the worker's family held,
were his dependents to reside at his place of work.
Since 1963 at least one of these reasons no longer applies. People
are free to migrate where they wish, constrained only by the financial
costs of. moving. There are thus no legal requirements calling for the
separation of the home from the workplace. However, in general most
other reasons do still apply, if not for the same causes then for their
post-colonial equivalent: family accommodation for low-income Africans
is still in very short supply in urban centers; there is still a need to
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earn wage income (most easily done in the urban areas) to participate
in the cash economy. Some authors have cited other reasons having to
do with the initiation of young men into manhood by leaving the home
for a period of work in the town (Elkan, 1967). Of course, the saving
objective of the "target" migrant still obtains.(4) All of this could
indicate that circular migration is still a dominant mode of rural-urban
interaction in Kenya today.
However, the facts of the matter would indicate that this is not
the case. Surveys in Nairobi among low-income squatters have shown that
74% of all adults had lived in the city for an average of 16.7 years.(5)
Only 27% of the shanty dwellers owned land outside the city and where
this occurred the land was already supporting members of the family
to its full capacity. To those employed in the formal sector, the
opportunity cost of quitting a job is now too high, given the increasing
numbers of job-seekers. The 1969 Census reveals a decrease in the sex
ratio among the Africans in Nairobi to 158 from 187 in 1962, indicating
that wives are joining their husbands in the city. Increased opportuni-
ties for female employment also support this trend. This evidence of
longer stays in Nairobi coupled with the lack of enough low-income
housing imply two possible consequences for the poorer half of Kenya's
urban population. First there must be a growing number of families
who maintain two households, one in the city and one in the rural areas.
Second, there must also be a growing number of families who maintain
overcrowded households in the city and who pay the social costs atten-
dent thereto. Recent studies have shown both cases to be true (Weisner,
1972; Etherton, 1971).
Weisner has shown that rural-urban kinship links have emerged which
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tie members of extended families together with a continuous flow of
people between the two residences. Further, his studies indicated that
the Western model of progressive nucleation of the family did not
obtain.(7) Another study showed that the annual remittances from urban
to rural areas amounted to about 20% of urban wage income (Johnson,
1972).
Etherton's surveys of Mathare Valley in Nairobi revealed an average
room occupancy rate of 4.4 people, with a room commonly not larger than
120 square feet.(8) In fact, it is possible that for those 27% who own
land in the rural areas, both characteristics of family living apply:
one end of the rural-urban network anchored in an overcrowded urban
dwelling and the other end subsisting on a small rural land holding.
Several studies have been done to determine the nature of demand
for urban housing in Kenya and the priority housing assumes in the list
of family needs among the low-income. When asked in 1970, Nairobi
squatters -- presumably drawn from the lowest income group -- listed
their priorities in the following order:
"Essential: 1. Food
2. Current standard of shelter on this location
3. School fees (for those with children of school age)
4. Clothes
Desirable: 5. Money to buy land
6. Money to contribute to extended family
7. Money to extend business
8. Money to build another room (possibly for rental)
9. Money to rent or buy a better house or room to live
in
10. Improved transport to job"(9)
More recent studies of the low-income groups in Kenya's smaller
urban centers by Hoek-Smit have supported the hypothesis that housing
is not a top priority item. Her surveys revealed that the percentage of
income spent on housing decreased rapidly with increases in income
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(Hoek-Smit, 1977). Her results confirmed those of earlier studies.
Refer to Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 Percentage of Household Income
Spent on Rent in Nairobi (1970)
Income group Percentage of income
Ksh per month spent on rent
less than 100 47
101-200 33
201-300 15
301-400 10
401-500 10
501-750 7
Source: Jorgenson, N.O., 1975, quoted in Hoek-Smit, 1977.
Hoek-Smit's major conclusions regarding the willingness of the low-
income to pay for housing and their desire for homeownership can be
summarized as follows:
"1. The majority of the heads of household in the low income-groups
is interested only in rented accommodation, especially those in
the bottom part of the income scale, and those with a lower degree
of job security. A large proportion of this group consists of
one-person households. Although people with an income below
Kshs 200/m are by necessity obliged to spend a large proportion
of their income on rent, in the higher income groups other items
on the family budget have a higher priority than the quality of
the house and people confer a high value to the low rents they are
paying presently. Thus, there is a high demand in the lower income
groups for cheap rental accommodation, preferably as single room
units.
2. Among the group with a monthly income of more than Kshs 300/m,
there is a considerable interest in obtaining a house of their
own, in particular among those with relatively stable employment
and those who live in town with their complete family. Most impor-
tantly, these people are generally willing to spend a much higher
proportion of their income on loan-repayments for their own house
than they would spend on rented accommodation: up to 30% for the
income group between Kshs 200/m and Kshs 300/m and decreasing to
about 15% of their income for higher income groups, above Kshs 500/m
500/m."(10)
That is, people falling in the lower middle income quintile are
willing to pay Ksh 80 ($9) to Ksh 100 ($12) per month to own their own
dwelling. People falling in the lowest income quintile are willing to
pay Ksh 40 ($4.80) to Ksh 60 ($7.20) to rent a dwelling and eschew home
ownership altogether.
Having considered the major features of the demand side of the low-
income housing equation let us now turn to the supply side. The fol-
lowing section reviews Kenya's response to the demand for shelter, a
demand which has been estimated largely on the basis of affordability.
The Emergance of Sites and Services as a National Strategy
The first Kenyan sites and services schemes originated in the early
1960s. During that decade the approach was used on an ad hoc basis
under a policy whereby the Government:
"recommended to local authorities the development of sites
and services housing schemes in which the local authority
equips suitable areas with water, sewers and roads, and
homeowners build their own houses under close supervision. "(11)
(emphasis added)
By 1970 approximately 1200 serviced sites had been prepared,
although the approach was not universally endorsed. The major objections
to sites and services grew out of their slow pace of construction
because of their reliance on self-help. At that time participants were
selected on the basis of need, not ability to pay. In addition they
were believed to be unsightly and plot ownership tended to concentrate
in the hands of the middle income groups. In 1967 the Chief Architect
of the Central Housing Board was quoted as saying:
"Most towns have back areas which can be used for sites and
services schemes where they will at least be hidden from the
sight of the majority of the population."(12)
Despite these official reservations, the concept was given further
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recognition in the National Development Plan for 1970-1974:
"These schemes will be a significant part of the housing program
in urban areas. If no alternatives are available, the lowest
income families will build the temporary houses they need anyway,
as witnessed by the large expanding illegal squatter areas near
the urban centers. It will be the responsibility of the local
authorities and the National Housing Corporation to ensure that
this activity is channeled into proper self-help schemes on
serviced sites, lest the task of removing them or providing
them with services later on becomes a grave problem. The degree
of servicing such sites will vary from the mere laying out of
the sites for houses and spaces for communal facilities to a
fully developed services system commensurate with the type of
community envisaged."(13)
(emphasis added)
By 1971 it had become clear that the existing public institutions
responsible for providing urban housing in Nairobi had begun to
manifest a distinct bias in favor of serving the needs of the middle
and upper income groups. Figure 3.1 illustrates the misfit between the
supply and demand for public housing in Nairobi between 1968 and 1971
as determined by Temple:
"It is apparent that virtually nothing was built by the public
sector between 1968 and 1971 which fell within the means of
the poorest third of the African population, that the middle
third of the African households was disproportionately favored
by the public sector program, and that the top third was
only very slightly underserved."(14)
The sample used for this analysis severely underrepresented the low-
income groups and therefore Temple's "poorest third" can be assumed
to be an optimistically small fraction of the total population. One
measure of the continuing shortage of low-income housing is the over-
whelming response to invitations to apply for forthcoming plots created
under the national sites and services described below. A report in
one of Nairobi's daily newspapers reported the following incident:
"The critical shortage of houses in Nairobi became evident yet
again when thousands of people formed long queues outside the
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table V-9.
offices of the National Housing Corporation on Friday and
Saturday to buy application forms for 512 serviced plots being
offered by the corporation at Kibera.
There was so much jostling for position in the queues
that police had to be called to control the crowd. The glass
partition between the applicants and the cashiers was shattered
by the crush.
Only a relatively small number of the crowd was served and
similar queues are expected for several days from today. Completed
application forms, being obtained at payment of Shs. 10, are to
be returned before September 17 at the Corporation's payment
office."(15)
Temple's data supported two unambiguous conclusions:
"First, public sector housing output in Nairobi since Independence
has been too small to meet the housing needs of a growing popu-
lace not satisfied by private formal sector construction; actual
public sector output has also been much smaller than planned
targets. Second, the public sector program has catered much
more to the city's middle and upper income groups than to its
poorer inhabitants. The inadequacy of public and private formal
sector housing construction to meet the needs of its growing
population, especially of the poorer residents, has forced many
of them to rely on the informal sector to meet their shelter
problems. It is therefore not surprising that the most compre-
hensive survey of informal housing development concluded that
tone third of Nairobi's population lives in uncontrolled and
illegal housing' (Etherton, 1971)."(16)
Temple attributes the cause of the middle class bias in part to:
"the city's closed political style (which) favors middle and
upper income residents over the poorer masses. Because elections
are relatively unimportant and the dominant party is disorganized,
the poor are unable to translate their numbers into political
power. The poor lack the resources -- education, wealth, contacts,
and jobs with discretionary control over potential favors --
which permit the city's emergent elite to take advantage of
personal contacts to make demands on the Government."(17)
Other factors which help explain the bias include an attitude among
the national elite that high housing standards are synonymous with
'modernity', that low housing standards schemes may become obsolete
before they are fully amortized, and the disproportionate rise in
construction costs compared with incomes.
The National Development Plan for 1974 to 1978 was even more
concrete than either of its two predecessors in prescribing a commit-
ment to a program of sites and services. It earmarked Ksh 520 million
($72 million) for the preparation of over 72,000 serviced plots in the
36 largest urban centers in the country.(18) This commitment stemmed
from the Government's overall approach to urban development, which was
characterized by the following objectives:
i. To achieve the maximum development of the rural areas so as
to slow down the rate of migration from the rural to the
urban areas.
ii. To establish a more even geographical spread of urban physi-
cal infrastructure in order to promote more balanced economic
growth throughout the nation and a more equitable standard
of social services between different areas.
iii. To encourage the expansion of several large towns in addition
to Nairobi and Mombasa (the port city), thereby providing more
alternatives for the absorption of the migrant population, and
avoiding the problems arising from excessive concentration in
these two towns.
iv. To continue to develop a network of communications, so as to
link centers of economic and social development.
v. To adopt standards for urban infrastructure which closely
relate to what can be afforded by the country as a whole."(19)
These objectives revealed an understanding of the inevitability of
rural-urban migration, limited agricultural land, rural-urban wage
differentials of 11:1, and the dissatisfaction of school leavers with
rural occupations. They disclosed a recognition of the fact that rural
development would not eliminate the influx of job-seekers to the cities
and towns. The Government saw past policy failures not in the contin-
ued stream of immigrants, but in the lack of housing and social services
made available to the new arrivals. Government viewed the solution to
the problem as lying in the successful implementation of a national
development strategy based on the concept of 'growth centers' to coun-
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teract the primacy of Nairobi and Mombasa.(20) Kenya recognized the
need for creating more urban jobs but reasoned that the inability to
elimate all unemployment in the short run will "influence the nature
and targets for development of certain areas within the towns."(21)
From this statement, coupled with objective v. above, one can infer
that a relaxation of the standards of the built form was to -be tolerated
where it could be shown that conventional standards could not be affor-
ded. This element of pragmatism in Kenya's philosophy of urban growth
provided the rationale for including a sites and services program as
one element of the strategy for growth center development.
The Sites and Services Adviser to the National Housing Corporation,
the implementing agency for the program, stated that the program was
expected to:
"offer through controlled and phased housing development a
realistic way of housing low income families, thereby reducing
the element of squatting;
provide the plotholders with an opportunity to earn extra
income and at the same time create additional rental accommodation
for those unsuccessful applicants and families with even lower
income;
increase the speed of housing development via the availability
of a materials loan combined with the fact that semi-permanent
and temporary materials may initially be used for construction;
spread the benefits to a wide group through the buying of locally
made materials by the plotholder from small shops and traders
and the employment of traditionally skilled labor; and
encourage the plotholder to invest in his house and its gradual
improvement."(22)
As currently conceived, the program calls for projects to be
located in existing urban centers to meet the needs of existing urban
residents. It is thus first and foremost a strategy of accommodation
directed almost exclusively at the need to provide shelter.
This chapter has identified some of the major features of the supply
and demand for low-income urban housing in Kenya. Reference was made to
a number of studies which indicate that there is a large demand for
cheap urban accommodation and that, to date, very little of this demand
has been met by the public sector. The low-income have taken to shel-
tering themselves in ways which match their own priorities but which
conflict with the values held by the country's housing planners. A
national program of sites and services has been designed to better
match public resources and values with the needs and demands of the
country's low-income groups.
It is important to state at this point that the Dandora Project was
technically not a part of the national sites and services program
announced as part of the National Development Plan for 1974-1978.
Dandora was conceived during the plan period of 1970-1974 as an experi-
ment in the large scale application of sites and services in Nairobi.
It was viewed as a pilot scheme which, if successful, would lead to
future projects of similar size in other Kenyan urban centers. Dandora
was envisioned not only as a source of new low-income housing, but it
was also seen by its planners as a vehicle for comprehensive community
development which could meet almost all the needs of the urban poor as
expressed in their list of priorities. In this sense Dandora repre-
sented a conceptual advance over the national program which was
ennunciated almost exclusively in terms of providing shelter. Whether
Dandora succeeded in playing this enhanced role will be left to a
later chapter.
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Chapter 4
A Chronological History
of the Dandora Project
Introduction
The evolution of the Dandora Project can be traced through five conse-
cutive but sometimes overlapping stages of development. These stages --
designated Definition, Preparation, Appraisal, Implementation and
Occupation -- span a total of eight years beginning in 1970. A summary
of this chronology is given as an Appendix. Each stage reveals a gra-
dual diminution in the emphasis placed on non-housing services and an
increasingly restrictive interpretation of the 'autonomous housing
principle'. The aim of this chapter is to analyze each of these changes
in emphasis and interpretation with a view to understanding the process
by which Dandora was implemented.
Project Definition: November 1970-December 1972
By 1970 the population of Nairobi had grown to 540,000, an increase of
220,000 since 1969. This rapid rate of expansion had generated a number
of growth-related problems which included an inadequate water supply,
traffic congestion, widespread unemployment, and a growing shortage of
low-income housing. Attempts to identify and attend to each of these
problems were made on a piecemeal basis by the Nairobi City Council.(1)
The fragmentation of this approach, coupled with the growing fiscal
crisis within the City Council, induced the Town Clerk to promote the
idea of a comprehensive metropolitan development study. It was hoped
that a coordinated effort to define Nairobi's future growth pattern
would help to identify the development projects required to accommodate
this growth and attract the international capital needed to finance the
identified projects. Thus, with the financial support of the central
Government, the United Nations Development Progr , the National
Christian Council of Kenya and the University of Nairobi, the City
Council established the Nairobi Urban Study Group (NUSG) in November
1970. The Study, an acocunt of which is given elsewhere (2), was inten-
ded to produce "a preferred strategy for the long term physical growth
of the greater urban area" and "prepare urban structure plans for the
medium term (1979-1985)".(3) In addition, a short term plan was required
which could be converted into a capital improvements program. The Study
Group consisted of about fifteen professionals -- mostly expatriate -- ,
a few Kenyan trainees and a small group of support staff. A budget of
U.S. $750,000 was allocated and the work was programmmed for completion
in early 1973.
During this same period, the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD) was rethinking its policy on development assis-
tance for housing and other 'non-productive' investments in urban
infrastructure. In recognition of the fact that "development means more
than just the expansion of output...the Bank decided to supplement its
activities in individual sectors with a more direct focus on the prob-
lems of urbanization."(4) The Special Projects Department (later split
into the Transportation and Urban Projects Departments) was created and
its senior officers were actively seeking out opportunities to finance
projects which would improve the patterns of urban transportation, land
use and housing in the urban centers of developing countries. Recon-
naisance missions to Nairobi in 1969 and 1971 had alerted the Department
to the possibilities of a suitable project.
The City Council's desire to attract foreign capital and the IBRD's
desire to supply it under appropriate lending conditions led to an
agreement between the two parties in March of 1971.
The IBRD agreed to review the Urban Study four times a year to
ensure that it contained planning proposals which were congruent with
the current lending policies of international aid agencies interested in
supporting Kenyan development. These agencies were willing to finance
projects which gave consideration to questions of economic equity as
well as growth. Their lending policies, unlike those of the 1960s,
required development programs and projects to have income redistribution
in favor of the low income groups as a major objective. The IBRD review
of the NUSG was designed to ensure that the redistributive objective was
a cornerstone of Nairobi's urban growth strategy.
In return, the City Council agreed to prepare a pre-feasibility
study for a comprehensive urbanization project. The project was to
involve the provision of serviced sites for low-income residential and
community facilities and squatter upgrading. The pre-feasibility work
was to be undertaken in parallel with the Nairobi Urban Study. Never-
theless, it was to be carried out within the basic guidelines of scope,
scale and beneficiaries determined by the larger Study. Temple has
characterized the NUSG as lacking organization, leadership and appro-
priate methodology.(5) Whatever its inadequacies, by late 1971 agree-
ment within the Group had yet to be reached on such basic issues as the
boundaries of the study area.
In view of this inauspicious beginning, the Deputy City Engineer
initiated the preparation of an interim urbanization project, pending
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further guidelines to be received from the Urban Study. Working with
staff from his department and students from the Department of Architec-
ture at the University of Nairobi, he prepared a draft report calling for
the development of a community for 60,000 people to be located on one of
several possible sites in the City's eastern area. The report, entitled
"Interim Urban Projects - A Preliminary Proposal" and referred to as the
Interim Report, was completed in March 1972. Drawing on information
collected in socio-economic surveys intitated by the Urban Study, it
outlined a project what would:
"bring together the necessary components of employment, shelter and
community action - linked by communication and utility service
systems."(6)
The 'target population' was defined to be those families earning less
than Ksh 500 per month ($60). The goals of the project were described
as follows:
"(a) to provide access to land and security of tenure on a long-term
basis (10,000 plots), primarily for residential use, with
supporting community facilities including schools and clinics;
(b) to control speculation and profitmaking at the expense of the
low income sector;
(c) to stimulate employment opportunities and industrial and commer-
cial activities by assisting in the organization of local
residents associations as for credit, purchasing, equipment,
training of special skills, management, legal assistance, and
marketing outlets (one of the obvious outlets being the new
communities mentioned in this proposal);
(d) to provide a framework within which residents can develop their
own plots by promoting the organization of local resident
associations to administer the development of housing units and
utility networks -- these associations being under guidance of
the quasi-private administrative institution proposed in this
document; and
(e) to provide communication and utilities channels which will stimu-
late transportation routes, and investment in, residential,
industrial and commercial activities, both within and near new
communities."(7)
The goals were to be achieved by the following means:
"(1) acquisition and preparation of 10,000 plots to serve as sites
for 20,000 rooms (10,000 housing units of two rooms each), to
accommodate an estimated low income population of at least
60,000;
(2) formation of a Financial Institution specializing in loans, for
materials and equipment, to the builder-leasee of 'incremental
investment' housing on these plots. This institution could also
construct some of the dwelling units itself and rent them to
qualified occupiers; and
(3) provision of manufacturing facilities - both plant and equipment
in the case of the larger facilities."(8)
The housing component of the project was to have the following
characteristics:
"(a) All services other than those pertaining to the preparation of
the plots will be provided by the City Council as part of its
regular responsibilities and will not be charged to the project.
This means that the costs of health facilities, circumferential
roads (other than those needed for the direct implementation of
the project), educational and social facilities will be borne by
the City Council budget and only partly covered by charges and
taxes paid by the inhabitants of the 10,000 plots;
(b) The built-form, while circumscribed by the nature of materials
and equipment provided, will be left to the discretion of the
builder-leasees, subject to regulations pertaining to safety
and sanitation. Design and production assistance will be neces-
sary to ensure sound investment by the individual;
(c) The Financial Institution will be a quasi-private body with
powers of eviction, transfer of title, loan moratoria and
renewal. The Financial Institution will procure building
materials and the equipment necessary to construct the housing
unit. It will then make loans -- in-kind in the form of materi-
als and possibly equipment (at an interest calculated to cover
its administrative expenses) to the builder-leasee. These loans
will be repaid over a period of up to 25 years. The Financial
Institution will also act as agent for the Nairobi City Council
for purposes of collecting the plot rent. This will facilitate
payment by the builder-leasee and reduction of administrative
expenses;
(d) The tied loans will be granted in amounts sufficient to enable
the construction of a two room dwelling on the plot. The
builder-leasee will construct the housing unit, perhaps in
cooperation with other such individuals as local resident
associations. At least one of the rooms built will be occupied
by the builder-leasee, while one of the rooms could be rented
by him to another qualified occupant. The responsibility for
repayment of the loan and for payment for water, sewerage,
refuse disposal and other chargeable services will rest with
the builder-leasee; and
(e) An attempt will be made (in a way yet to be determined) to
relate the supply of building materials and equipment to the
manufacturing facilities contemplated under (3) above."(9)
The intent was to formulate a project based on John Turner's thesis
of incremental community development largely under the control of the
builder-leasee or participant population. Turner had visited Nairobi
in 1971 and had met with members of the working group.
The omission of a possible upgrading component, the total absence of
the term 'sites and services' and the proposal to establish a Financial
Institution "specializing in loans for materials and equipment...(and
which) could also construct some of the dwelling units itself and rent
them to qualified occupiers"(10) can be construed as an attempt to
minimize the anticipated political opposition to the thinly disguised
proposal for a community development based on the site and service
principle. The report clearly articulated the choices open to policy
makers as to the mode of development for the housing component: the
INSTANT solution whereby dwellings are entirely contractor-built, and the
INCREMENTAL solution whereby the homeowner improves his dwelling as and
when family priorities permit. Without belittling the value of the
instant solution, the report strongly recommended the incremental
approach as being the only realistic one for housing Nairobi's urban
poor. In an apparent attempt to leave room for negotiation, the report
"outlines the project merely as a basis for discussion and in order to
ascertain the interest of the IBRD in a project of this type."(ll)
The IBRD was indeed interested. In February 1972, a mission had
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reviewed the draft report and considered it sufficiently promising to
declare a site and service scheme high priority for Nairobi.(12) At
this time the IBRD was preparing the final appraisal report for its first
sites and services project, consisting of 15,000 plots in Senegal, and
was eager to support similar projects in other developing countries.
The Kenyan Government was much less interested. In February 1972,
in contradication of the 1970-1974 Development Plan, a high-level meeting
of civil servants vetoed the idea of urban sites and service schemes in
Kenya.(13) The decision was taken on the grounds that such projects
were aesthetically unpleasing and that plots ended up being owned by
middle- and high-income absentee landlords. This negative impression of
sites and services was formed largely on the basis of the Kariobangi Pro-
ject implemented in Nairobi in 1964. This project allocated plots on the
basis of need and not ability to pay and therefore took several years to
consolidate.
The following month the report was submitted to the Ministry of
Local Government (MLG) for approval and onward transmission to the IBRD.
Under the circumstances, the Ministry was loathe to endorse the proposal.
Indeed, it had withheld approval of the whole exercise since the middle
of 1971, when the pre-feasibility study was proposed. After three months
of deliberations, however, the MLG finally approved the project. Temple
has surmised that rather than jeopardize the funding of several other
development projects then under consideration by the IBRD, including the
new $60 million airport, the new Kenyan Government reversed its decision
on Nairobi's proposed urbanization project.(14) In September 1972, the
study was sent to the IBRD for formal acceptance. In November 1972, a
review mission from Washington recommended that a full-scale feasibility
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study be carried out with a view to preparing a detailed project
proposal for IBRD financing.
Project Preparation: January 1973-May 1974
In response to the IBRD recommendation, the Town Clerk of the Nairobi
City Council formed a Housing Task Force (HTF) to undertake the pre-
paration of the detailed project proposal. The Task Force was composed
of an Action Group consisting of full-time administrative staff and
three Working Groups made up of part-time technical specialists assigned
from various departments with the City Council.
The long term objectives of the HTF were defined to be:
"the increase in the supply of serviced sites in the City to a level
adequate to meet the demand. (This involves)
(a) Establishing an organization and linkages between involved
authorities which are capable of the project (sic) and capable
of being expanded to meet the full demand.
(b) Developing the (designated areas of the City) in such a way
that plots for housing and infrastructure and community facili-
ties are available to the low-income groups which are not
otherwise catered for."(15)
The Action Group was chaired by a member of the City Engineer's
Department. The British Overseas Development Administration provided
a Technical Director to lead the study. A counterpart Director was
assigned from the City Engineer's Architect Section. The remainder of
the Action Group consisted of representatives from each of the three
Working Groups, an administrative officer and a secretary. Working
Group I was responsible for liaison with the Nairobi Urban Study Group
to ensure that the project conformed with the development goals adopted
for the City as a whole. Group II was responsible for the preparation
of the physical design. Group III was responsible for the development
57
of the administrative procedures needed to implement the scheme.
The Technical Director of the Task Force took up his duties on
January 27 1973. A program of activities was drawn up calling for the
completion of the report for submission to the IBRD in June of 1973.
From the start, the work was plagued by many of the same issues which
hindered the preparation of the Interim Report and which continued
to impede the progress of the Urban Study. The three most important
factors contributing to this situation were lack of leadership, lack
of manpower, and a major debate on physical standards.
The Technical Director, recruited on two months notice from abroad,
was never accepted as the team leader by members of the Task Force.
Many of the Senior Officers, both expatriate and local, had extensive
knowledge and experience of the Nairobi situation and resented the
intrusion of a newcomer in a position of authority. When his six-month
contract expired in June, the Technical Director left, the majority of
his tasks still unfinished. With his departure, the chairman of Working
Group II emerged as the driving force behind the project and he even-
tually became the Deputy Project Manager.
The lack of qualified manpower was a problem shared by the whole
of the City Council. Recruitment of technical personnel was difficult
in the face of much higher salaries offered by the private sector and
central Government. The creation of the HTF increased the burden on
the existing staff who, for the most part, were limited to part-time
duty on the project. Their other responsibilities included the daily
running of departments and, in some cases, contributing to the ongoing
Nairobi Urban Study.
Progress within the HTF varied from Group to Group. Group I
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consisted largely of its Chairman, who was responsible for liaising
with the Urban Study in an attempt to define the scope and scale of the
project and its intended beneficiaries. Since progress within the
Urban Study Group was minimal, meaningful liaison proved difficult.
Group II's progress on the physical design was hindered by disagreement
on the question of standards. This question is treated in more detail
below. Group III tackled such questions as plot allocation procedures,
the administration of materials and plot loans, and the control of legal
plot occupation. They were also required to design the structure of
the organization which would implement the project. These tasks
involved sensitive questions of how to allocate the land, labor, and
capital tied up in the project. Over the months a pattern emerged
whereby progress was the most rapid in Group II, followed by Group III,
and lastly by Group I. The pattern reflects the extent to which the
tasks were defined, the degree to which the Groups were equipped to do
the work, and the political sensitivity of the particular issues with
which each Group had to deal.
By October 1973 a Draft Project Report was ready for discussion with
the IBRD. The two-volume study contained a well-defined philosophy
based on the sites and services principle:
"The Authority demarcates plots and provides basic services including
water drainage, sanitation, paths, roads, electricity and telephones
at a standard compatible with the ability of the plot occupants to
pay.....Responsibility for the provision of housing rests with the
occupants under the supervision of the Authority.....Minimum
dwellings consisting of w.c., store (closet), cooking space, and
two habitable rooms are to be built to the requirements of the
Authority within 18 to 24 months of allocation."(16)
A number of important decisions were made. A project site was
selected from among those proposed in the Interim Report. A site
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located at Dandora - approximately 11 kilometers north east of the city
center - was chosen on the basis of conformity with the Nairobi Urban
Study and easy accessibility to currently existing and planned employ-
ment centers (Refer to Figure 1.1). A land use planning concept was
defined. The elongated shape of the site dictated a physical plan in
which residential areas were appended to a commercial and residential
spine which ran from west to east along the center of the site. The
"central spine" concept became the organizing principle governing the
physical planning of Dandora. The Draft Report also contained detailed
descriptions of many of the administrative components of the project.
Alternative proposals for allocating plots, managing material loans,
and controlling the legal occupation of plots were developed. Designs
for plot layouts were prepared showing alternative methods of service
and house design. A preliminary financial plan was drawn up.
The Draft Report differed from the Interim Report in a number of
significant and subtle ways. The selection of a specific site and the
apparent need to limit the project to one site had imposed a reduction
in the size of the development. The planned number of plots was reduced
to 6,000 or 7,000 because the Dandora site was too small for 10,000
plots. Households participating in the program could not have an
income greater than Ksh 650 per month ($78). This represented a thirty
percent increase over the maximum target income established in the
Interim Report.
The Draft Report called for a comprehensive community development
but with less emphasis on the creation of employment and more emphasis
on the provision of housing. Rather than the concrete action called
for in the Interim Report, the Draft Report -- in a kind of indicative
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planning -- required that:
"trade commerce, and service industry is to be encouraged early
(in the process) to serve the population and to provide employ-
ment."(17)(emphasis added)
The Financial Institution, described in the Interim Report as having
direct involvement in employment creation, was transformed into an
authority "whose primary function is to develop an extensive area of
the City to be handed over to the City for running."(18) There was
a perceptible increase in the amount of control which the City Council
was to exert over the participants in the project.
The project had started the slow but perceptible process of conver-
sion from comprehensive community development to peri-urban housing
estate. This shift can be explained in part by the physical planning
bias of the Housing Task Force which caused their terms of reference
to be expressed in terms of the provision of shelter, not jobs. The
ambiguity surrounding the goals of the Task Force is strikingly
illustrated by the fact that it was sometimes called an Urbanization
Task Force. Notwithstanding this confusion, it was evident that the
housing objective was beginning to dominate the urbanization objective
of the project.
In one respect the Draft Report represented an improvement over
the Interim Report. Whereas the latter made no reference to improving
existing squatter settlements, the Draft Report included provision for
a study on the subject, all the while asserting that "the development of
new residential areas takes priority over the upgrading of existing
ones."(19) Adding to the housing stock was still the primary objective
of the proposal. Government authorities were still disinclined to
tackle the difficult issues surrounding the legalization of squatters.
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The upgrading study, however, created the opportunity for future efforts
in that direction. The IBRD was to insist'that such studies be carried
out as part of the community development scheme. This component of
the project was given further consideration during the project appraisal
stage.
In spite of the comprehensive appearance of the Report, it lacked
commitment on many of the difficult and important issues. There was a
lack of firm policy decisions on the questions of physical infrastruc-
ture standards. In addition, the Task Force had been unable to agree
on an organizational structure for the proposed project department. The
IBRD was clearly frustrated by this lack of decision on the part of the
Housing Task Force. A pre-appraisal mission in March 1974 forced the
issue and gave the Town Clerk a blunt ultimatum to finalize all the
outstanding issues without delay or risk having the whole venture can-
celled. As a result, the idea of a Final Report was dropped and
priority given to filling in the gaps in the Draft Report. One of the
most important missing pieces was a detailed layout of the site showing
the 6,000 plots.
The conflict within the City Council over the issue of standards
of physical infrastructure is one of the most crucial issues of Dandora.
The debate took place within the context of the larger national debate
on the value of sites and services as a housing strategy. At the time
the Draft Project Report was being written there were at least two
major issues involving standards. The first concerned the extent to
which Dandora should cater for private automobile ownership. The second
issue focused on the desire for a waterborne sewage system which provi-
ded individual connections to each plot at costs affordable to the
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participant income group. Without reaching agreement on both these
issues, it was clear that a detailed site plan for Dandora could not
be drawn up. The two issues are of interest because of the different
light each sheds on the question of standards.
The problem of waterborne sewage was of concern primarily to the
technical specialists. The battle lines were drawn between the
engineers in the Task Force who were designing the system and those in
the City Council's Water and Sewage Department who would have to operate
it. It is significant to note that at this point the opinion of the
Municipal Medical Officer of Health was not sought. His evaluation of
the proposal came only after the first 1,000 plots had been prepared and
is discussed later. The question -- perceived purely in technical
terms -- was how much could the design of the system deviate from
standard Council practice in an effort to save money without creating
additional maintenance problems. It was seen as a tradeoff between
lower development costs and higher maintenance costs. The designers
proposed locating main sewer lines in way-leaves on private property.
They argued that this solution would result in significant cost savings
of shs 1700 (U.S.$204) per plot over the conventional approach which
positioned mains under the streets and used long branch mains to connect
the individual core units to the main. A similar proposal for on-plot
water distribution was advanced, with concomitant cost savings of Ksh
320 per plot ($39).(20) The disadvantage of the proposal was that the
short branch mains connecting the core units furthest from the main
had to pass under the core units adjacent to the main (see Figure 4.1).
The Water and Sewage Department also argued that the proposed sewerage
layout, resulting in manholes and inspection chambers deep inside
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private property, did not allow easy maintance of the system. In the
rush to finalize the project design before June 1974, the designer's
proposal was adopted with the support of the Town Clerk. Further debate
was still to come, however, when the MOH reviewed the design some two
years later.
The problem of accommodating automobiles in Dandora was of interest
to a broader constituency. Conscious of the car as a glamorous status
symbol in Kenya, City Councillors argued that every plot holder would
aspire to ownership. Each plot should therefore be direclty accessible
by car and also large enough to allow on-plot parking. The technicians'
argument against this rested on the findings of the NUSG that the proba-
bility of a household in the target income group owning a car was
3.6%.(21) Assuming three families per plot, this amounted to a maximum
of 110 cars per 1000 plots. The politicians were calling for a site
plan which could accommodate 9 times this number. In the rush to
finalize the project layout, the principle of one car per plot was
accepted. The actual layout, in fact, provided 80% of the 6,000 plots
with direct access from roads without intervening footpaths. Type
designs for plot layouts showed spaces for car parking. Unlike the
debate on standards of sanitation, the conflict could not be resolved
on technical grounds alone. The issue, involving the notion of rising
expectations amongst Nairobi's low income groups, had an explicit
political component which gave municipal politicians the leverage to
get their way. As with the sewer system, this issue would be taken up
again within the year.
During this stage of the Dandora Project, relations between the
City Council and central government took a turn for the worse. One of
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the causes of this decline was the central government's abolition of
the Graduated Personal Tax (GPT), the source of one half of Nairobi's
municipal revenue. The tax collected by the City Council was levied on
all employers and was assessed as a function of the wages they paid
their employees. The GPT was replaced by a nationwide sales tax levied
by the central Government on all manufactured goods. A temporary pro-
gram of annual grants by the Central Treasury to the City Council was
proposed to provide Nairobi with financial assistance until it could
develop alternative sources of revenue through increased rates and rents
and other municipal levies. Neither the grants nor the alternative
sources of revenue have materialized. Since 1973 the Council has been
incurring annual deficits on General Fund current account, with a
consequent decrease in the quality and quantity of the urban services
it provides. The financial crisis, coupled with the usual allegations
of inefficiency and corruption, came to a head in 1976, just as Dandora
was ready for occupation. The repercussions of this intergovernmental
rancor are dealt with later.
Project Appraisal: June 1974-May 1975
The appraisal stage of the Dandora Project commenced in June of 1974
with the arrival of the IBRD mission in Nairobi. In the three months
since the departure of the pre-appraisal mission the Housing Task Force
gave the project a concerted push. It was able to finalize a physical
plan for the Dandora site which satisfied the IBRD. The review of the
proposed implementation organization and financial issues was undertaken
in October. With the physical design of the scheme more or less agreed
on, it became the primary concern of the IBRD to see that:
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"the Nairobi City Council establish a working mechanism set up to
run the overall housing program."(22)
Additional delays in the appraisal were caused by difficulties in
defining the studies which the IBRD wanted written into the project.
World Bank involvement in Kenyan economic development, going back to
the late 1950s, had made the IBRD aware of many of Kenya's institu-
tional shortcomings. Three of these deficiencies were singled out for
study as part of the Dandora Project:
(a) the structure of municipal finance in Kenya
(b) the Nairobi City Council's organizational ability to mount an
effective housing program; and
(c) the Government of Kenya's antipathy towards the concept of
squatter upgrading.
These studies were to become conditions of negotiation. There were
intended to induce a process of re-education among Kenya's policy makers
and open the way to long term solutions for the country's institutional
problems associated with rapid urban growth.
In August 1974, the appraisal team began documenting their findings
in a three-step process of report production. By October 1974 a draft
report was circulating within the Special Projects Department. After
revisions and departmental approval, the report was reviewed by other
sections of the IBRD. These included the Financial Controller, Projects
Policy, Economics, and Legal Departments. In January 1975 the final
appraisal report was approved by the Loans Committee. At the same time
in Nairobi the Works and Town Planning Committee, which was composed of
all the Departments in the City Council, approved the content of the
scheme and the structural plans for Phase I consisting of 1,000 plots.
It also designated the project area as a zone governed by the Grade II
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Building By-laws which permitted more relaxed standards of house con-
struction than are required under the Grade I By-laws which govern most
of the rest of the City.
After three months of detailed negotiations between the IBRD, the
IDA, the Kenyan Government and the City Council, loan and credit agree-
ments were signed on May 6 1975 by all parties.
In its final appraised form the Dandora Community Development Pro-
ject consisted of the following components:
(a) New Residential Lots: The project was to provide about 6,000 lots
with individual water and sewer connections and related basic services
and infrastructure, including roads, security lighting, and refuse
collection. The 6,000 lots included about 1,800 of 100 m 2, 2,100 of
120 m 2, 1,800 of 140 m 2, and 300 of 160 m2 each (refer to Figure 4.2).
The people to whom residential lots were to be allocated were to have
leasehold tenure for a period of 50 years. Title deeds to each plot
would be issued after allottees had constructed a dwelling approved by
DPD. The gross density of the project was designed to be 32 plots per
hectare (13 plots per acre). Plot occupancy rates were assumed to be
10 people per plot, giving gross residential population densities of
320 people per hectare. This compares with densities of 310, 291, and
271 for Maringo, Makadara and Mbotela respectively, three of Nairobi's
most densely populated residential areas.(24) (Refer to Figure 1.1) The
results of a land use profile analysis of Phase I of the project are
summarized in Table 4.1. The proportions of land allocated to each
use conform to normal standards of practice with roads perhaps a little
high at 23%. This can be attributed to the high priority given to
vehicular access to each plot.
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Table 4.1
Phase I Land Use Profile
Percen
Use land a
tage of
llocated
Residential 62
Roads 23
Footpaths 6
Incidental Open Space 9
Total 100
Source: Mutiso Menezes International, Dandora
Phase II Preliminary Design Report,
June 1976, p.1 62 .
(b) Core Units: Each lot was to be provided with basic lot services
consisting of water connections to w.c., shower and gulley basin,
sewerage and waste water drains in a contractor-built superstructure
("wet core") [refer to Figure 4.3]. In order to accommodate different
income levels within the low-income sector, three options of wet core
and shelter units were to be provided:
Option A (65%) 3,900 lots, including 30 reserved for demonstration
2
units in three different sizes -- 100, 120, and 140 m2. Each was to
have the basic lot services in the wet cores and participants would
be offered a construction materials loan (Ksh 4,800) for developing
their shelter. Owners were expected to develop the shelter through
self-help or hired labor. Total lot development costs inclusive
of the materials loan and physical contingencies were estimated at
between Ksh 11,000 and Ksh 12,000 per lot depending on the lot size
chosen. About 30 of the 3,900 lots were to be developed with dif-
ferent materials and room layouts by the Project Department for
demonstration purposes at a per unit cost of about Ksh 14,700.
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Option B (30%) 1,800 lots in three different sizes -- 100, 120, and
2140 m2. In addition to the wet cores outlined in Option A above,
each will have one contractor-built room. Lot owners were to be
offered a construction materials loan (Ksh 2,400) for further devel-
opment of the shelter to suit personal requirements using either
self-help or subcontracting. Total development costs including
materials loans ranged between Ksh 12,000 and Ksh 13,000.
Option C (5%) 330 lots, all 160 m2 in area, will have a contractor-
built dwelling consisting of two built rooms. No materials cost
would be offered to lot owners. The development cost of Option C
lots was estimated to be approximately Ksh 16,500.
(c) Materials Loan Fund: Materials loans would be made available to
project participants for self-help extensions to supplement other sources
of funds, including personal savings and borrowings. Participants would
construct or extend their own dwelling on the basis of approved designs.
The Project Department, through its Financial Division, was to oper-
ate the materials loans scheme. Materials loans would be made in cash
but each loan tranche would not exceed the security provided by the
allottee's deposit against the mortgage (Ksh 400) plus the value of the
materials in that portion of the house already constructed. The funds
were to be lent at 8.5% interest and repayable over 30 and 20 years for
Options A and B respectively. Option A allottees would also have a
five year grace period on this principle.
The maximum materials loan for Option A allottees was to be Ksh
4,800, sufficient to build two rooms, and Ksh 2,400 for Option B
allottees. Because of the flexibility of the computerized accounting
system, allottees were to be allowed to borrow any amount of money up
to the maximum.
(d) Community Facilities: The project was to construct primary schools,
health centers, multi-purpose community centers incorporating day-care
facilities, sports facilities and markets. Primary schools, accounting
for about 60% of the investment in community facilities, would provide
up to 5,600 student places -- allowing the project area the same level
of provision as the rest of Nairobi. The community centers were to
accommodate activities such as community meetings, adult education, and
other recreation.
(e) Trunk Infrastructure: The trunk sewerage would comprise two branch
sewers from the project area to the proposed main city trunk sewer, 14.5
km of main trunk sewer running alongside the Nairobi River to a sewerage
treatment works, a temporary stabilization pond to serve the first 1,000
housing lots by mid-1976, and a sewage treatment works to serve the
equivalent of 230,000 people.
(f) Technical Assistance: The project was to finance costs of the
Project Department and of detailed engineering and construction super-
vision. Also included were the financing of studies and project
monitoring and evaluation.
(g) Studies: The studies to be undertaken as part of the project
included: (i) municipal finance and functions throughout Kenya to be
conducted jointly by the Government and the International Monetary Fund;
(ii) NCC Housing Operations; and (iii) preparation of future site and
services and upgrading schemes in Nairobi and other urban areas. The
joing GOK/IMF Finance Study would provide technical details on how the
Government should deal with the financial crisis facing the country's
local governments. The NCC Study would result in proposals for the
reorganization of Council's housing operations including budgeting and
managerial techniques. Preparation of follow-up projects mentioned
under (c) above would be done under the direction of the Ministry of
Housing and Social Services in accordance with terms with terms of refer-
ence acceptable to the IBRD.
(h) Monitoring: Monitoring and evaluation of the project was to be done
by a team from the University of Nairobi under the supervision of the
Planning Section of the Ministry of Finance and Planning.
(i) Nutrition: Over the project implementation period, UNICEF will
assist the Nairobi City Council to carry out a survey of nutrition
needs in sample low-income areas in the city.(23)
The following infrastructure standards were adopted:
(a) Roads and Surface Water Drainage: The site would have a circulation
network providing a primary ordering framework around which the lot
layout plan is developed. The site is linked to the city network from
Komo Rock Road. Within the site, there is a main through street running
along the ridge which also forms the spine containing the community
facilities. This main street is linked to a network of secondary roads
and footpaths running transversely within the residential zones on
either side of the spine. Standards and specifications adopted for the
various of circulation were as follows:
(i) Main Roads, serving as collector roads carrying bus traffic were
to be constructed to bus route standards with an overall reservation
of about 20 meters. The carriageway was to be paved and would have
footpaths on both sides with a surface water drainage ditch on each
side of the footpaths. The footpath construction comprises 150 mm
murram (gravel) paving on compacted formation. The surface water
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drainage ditch construction comprises concrete invert block channel
with 50 mm concrete slabs.
(ii) Secondary Roads would provide vehicular and pedestrian accesses
to the residential lots. These roads were to have an overall reser-
vation of about 12 meters with a murram (gravel) carriageway and
footpaths on both sides with a surface water drainage ditch on each
side of the footpaths. The footpath construction comprises 100 mm
murram paving and the surface water drainage ditch was to be the
same as described for main roads.
(iii) Parking Areas were to be provided along the secondary roads
at convenient locations and would consist of 150 mm murram paving
on graded and compacted formation. Connecting footpaths and surface
water drainage was to be provided.
(b) Water Supply: Individual water supply connections would be provided
to each lot to serve a water closet, a shower, an outside tap and with
provision for installing a water tap and sink in the kitchen at a later
date. Water service on each lot would be metered.
(c) Sewerage: All lots would have individual wet core units with
waterborne sewerage facilities. The sewerage system is designed to
conform to NCC's water and sewerage department specifications.
(d) Electricity: A system of street lighting and security lighting at
communal areas would be installed. Individual metered electric connec-
tions would be available from the East Africa Power and Lighting Company,
on application by a stated number of households.
(e) Refuse Collection: Approximately 120 concrete hardstandings would
be provided for the whole area. NCC would provide the necessary bins
and collection services and charge plot holders accordingly.
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(f) Site Preparation: Site preparation involves topographic survey
including lot demarcation and earthworks. Lot demarcation involves
beaconing out each corner of lot and stamping of title by the Commis-'
sioner of Lands. Earthworks involves clearing and grading.(24)
Cost estimates for site preparation, on-site servicing, and core
units were based on detailed engineering for about 700 lots and prelim-
inary engineering for the remainder. Estimates for trunk infrastructure
were based on preliminary engineering. Total project costs were esti-
mated at Ksh 211 ($25.3) million at January 1975 base prices. Physical
contingencies of 15% on lot preparation and infrastructure, and 5% on
community facilities and core units were included. Price escalation
was calculated at 15% in 1975 and 12% annually for the period 1976
through 1979. Foreign exchange costs were estimated at about 26%. The
main costs categories are summarized together with their allocation
amongst project beneficiaries in Table 4.2.
Of the total cost of the project the Kenyan Government was to
provide Ksh 97 ($11.6) million and the International Development Agency
(IDA) and the IBRD were to split the balance of Ksh 114 ($13.7) million
evenly. The Kenyan Government was to on-lend the IDA/IBRD funds to the
Nairobi City Council at 8 1/2% interest for 25 years, including a grace
period of four years. The Kenya contribution was to be lent to the City
Coundil at 6 1/2% over 25 years. The construction schedule for the
project calls for the first 1,000 plots to be ready for occupation by
July 1976. The remaining 5,000 plots in Phases II and III were to be
ready by July 1978, by which time the necessary trunk infrastructure was
also to be completed. The construction of community facilities and the
administration of the material loans were scheduled to be completed by
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Table 4.2
Project Cost Estimates and Allocation to Beneficiaries
Cost Estimates Cost Allocations (%)
% of Total Nairobi City Council
Ksh '000 US $'000 Project User Community Recovered
Category Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Costs fees,rates facilities from lots
1. Site
Preparation 109 9 118 305 27 332 1.6 1 8 91
2. On-Site In-
frastructure 803 268 1,071 2,250 750 3,000 14.4 44 6 50
3. Community
Facilities 295 98 393 824 275 1,099 5.3 100 0 0
4. Core Units 1,146 382 1,528 3,209 1,070 4,279 20.6 0 0 100
5. Materials
Loan Fund 1,145 1,145 3,205 3,205 15.4 0 0 100
6. Trunk Infra-
structure 1,461 702 2,163 4,092 1,965 6,057 29.2 100 0 0
7. Technical
Assistance 466 477 943 1,304 1,336 2,640 13.5 87 6 7
8. Subtotals 5,425 1,936 7,361 15,189 5,423 20,612 100.0 --- --
9. Contingencies:
Physical 364 223 587 1,019 624 1,643 65 5 30
(7.9% of
base cost)
Price (32% of 1,972 623 2,595 5,522 1,744 7,266 --- --
row 8 & 9)
TOTAL 7,761 2,782 10,543 21,731 7,790 29,521 --- --
Source: IBRD Appraisal Report 607a-KE, p.11 and Annex 9, Table 1.
December 1979.
By May 1975 it was quite clear that the intent of the project had
moved away from the objective of creating employment except as a tempor-
ary by-product of construction activity. The objective of job creation
was relegated to future projects, the preparation of which would be done
as part of the studies outlined in the project agreement. It was anti-
cipated that no more than 1,000 jobs would be created by the construc-
tion of 400 market stalls as part of the community facilities.(25)
The major thrust of the project was concerned with testing the
viability of the large scale application of the sites and services
approach as a "low-cost solution to the shelter and service needs of
Kenya's urban poor."(26) At 1974 estimated income levels, it was anti-
cipated that two thirds of the 6,000 plots would be affordable by
households as low as the 20th percentile in the income distribution
curve, that is, families earning Ksh 280 ($34) per month.
Two additional points deserve mention. First, the scale of the
project implied that what was really being proposed was a new town of
sixty to one hundred thousand people for the city of Nairobi. Yet the
detailed planning of the development focused almost exclusively on the
housing component of the community. Secondly, Dandora was an experi-
ment. It was seen as a pilot project which, if successful, would lead
to more and larger efforts to accommodate Nairobi's growth.
Project Implementation: May 1975-November 1976
The signing of the loan and credit agreements marked the beginning of
the Implementation stage of Dandora. The Dandora Project Department
(DPD) was especially created within the Nairobi City Council to implement
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the project. The Head of the Department, the Project Manager, reported
solely to the Dandora Community Development Project Committee (DCDPC),
established by the NCC to oversee the implementation of the project.
The NCC Town Clerk was appointed as Secretary of the Committee, which
included representatives of the Ministry of Finance and Planning,
Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Housing and Social Services,
the National Housing Corporation and the Provincial Commissioner of
Nairobi.
Within one month, tender documents for Phase I were completed by
the Technical Section of DPD. In July the Commissioner of Lands of the
Ministry of Lands and Settlement handed over the Phase I site to DPD.
Tenders were invited for the first 1,000 units shortly thereafter.
The contract for Phase I, valued at Ksh 12.7 ($4.53) million,
was awarded to S.S. Mehta and Sons. Mehta, acting both as general
contractor and sub-contractor for the on-site civil engineering work,
started construction on October 11, 1975. The contract period was set
at 52 weeks. The firm of Patrickson and Coxon was appointed building
sub-contractor for the core units. Patrickson and Coxon put in a bid
for the building works based on a system of precast concrete panels, in
addition to a bid based on the traditional concrete block wall construc-
tion called for in the tender documents. Tara Chana, an architect-
planner in DPD, has reported the following:
"The original tender documents called for 100 mm concrete block
walls in the w.c. and shower units without plaster. This was done
to keep the cost low and at the same time the individual plot
allottees were expected to plaster the walls of the wet core soon
after taking over the plots. The proposed prefab panel system had
the advantage of smooth surfaces, amongst other advantages. The
smooth surfaces could be easily washed, thus providing a more
hygienic toilet and shower at almost competitive costs. The prefab
panel system also offered other advantages in terms of weathering,
structural strength, impermeability, thermal insulation, acoustic
properties, fire resistance, vermin resistance and ease of nailing,
among other advantages.....These advantages and related aspects of
the system were not easily seen by non-technicians. Three mock-up
wet core units were built on the site to demonstrate the differences
in the two alternatives. After actually demonstrating the advan-
tages the non-technicians seemed to have more faith in the system
and it was finally accepted as a viable alternative to the conven-
tional construction method as specified in the original tender
documents."(27)(emphasis added)
The last minute change to the prefabricated system meant increasing
the physical standards of the project at the expense of affordability
by the low-income groups. Chana reports that a square meter of pre-
fabricated wall panel cost Ksh 45 ($5.40) compared with Ksh 32 ($3.84)
for concrete block, inclusive of labor, materials and overheads. This
represents a 40% increase in the cost of walling the core units, all
of which is payable by the allottee (refer to Table 4.2, item 4).
With construction proceeding on site, attention shifted to the
design of the detailed administrative procedures required to operate
and implement the project. The design of plot application forms
prepared by DPD's Community Development Section was approved in March,
at which time they went on sale to the public. At first sales were slow.
Poor public relations work on the part of the Project Department had
created confustion in the mind of the public between Dandora and another
more expensive City Council housing project also under construction. A
mass media advertising campaign was therefore launched to promote
Dandora. By the time applications closed on June 30, 1976 a total of
20,948 forms had been sold at Ksh 20 each. Of this number, 16,018 were
completed and returned to DPD. During July and August, the applications
were processed and prospective allottees were interviewed in attempts
to verify information contained in the applications. A total of 6,710
were discarded as being ineligible. That is, the applicants did not
meet the following criteria:
(a) The total income at the time of application of the tenant and
such members of his family as will live with him on his plot was
between Ksh 280/- and Ksh 500/- per month for Option A plots and
Ksh 450/- and Ksh 650/- per month for Option B plots.
(b) The prospective tenant had lived in Nairobi for at least two
years immediately prior to his application for a plot and did
not own any residential property in Nairobi.
(c) The tenant's family (spouse, if any, or children) did at the time
of application, and would, upon allocation of a plot, reside with
the tenant.
(d) Prospective tenants would pay NCC the appropriate fees for
sewerage and water connection and a deposit of Ksh 400 within
sixty days of notification that they have been allocated a plot.
In addition, applications were disqualified if they were incomplete,
illegible, duplicates of earlier submissions, not accompanied by suppor-
ting documents showing proof of income, or not submitted on the official
forms.
Thus there remained 9,308 applications bidding for 6,000 plots
according to the breakdown in Table 4.3:
Table 4.3
Number of Applications by Plot Option
Ratio of
No. of No. of Applications
Applications Plots to Plots
Option A 5,634 3,870 1.5:1
Option B 3,674 1,800 2:1
TOTAL 9,308 5,670 1.6:1
On September 24 1976 the list of successful applicants was produced
by a computerized balloting system. The computer allocated 5,670 plots
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to applicants randomly within plot Options A and B. The names of the
3,638 unsuccessful candidates were placed in random order on waiting
lists. Formal letters of offer were sent to the 5,670 allottees on
October 7 1976. They were given six weeks to accept the offer and pay
the down payment of Ksh 400 ($48) and the water connection fee of Ksh
150 ($18). During this period, the Community Development Section held
orientation meetings to familiarize allottees with the nature and
requirements of the project. All but 55 allottees accepted the offer.
Those plots not accepted were re-offered to applicants on the waiting
list. The allocation process was carried out quickly because 20 social
work students were hired on a temporary basis from the University of
Nairobi to supplement the efforts of 10 permanent Community Development
assistants. Three issues created controversy about the allocation
procedure. First, it took some time before the idea of computer
balloting was accepted by the City Council. The more common manual
systems of balloting were easier to tamper with. Second, Councillors
began submitting bulk applications on behalf of their constituents in
efforts to maximize the chances of being allocated plots. This created
the third issue: a debate on the pros and cons of interviewing each
applicant. In the absence of a detailed analysis of the plot allocation
process, it can only be surmised that the vast majority of allottees
met the selection criteria. Whether the allottees retained control over
the use and development of their plots will be taken up in the next
chapter.
While Phase I was under construction, the issue of physical stan-
dards was raised once again. This time City Council Chief Officers
voiced the criticism. In May 1976 the Medical Officer of Health
reviewed in detail the plot layouts and core unit designs for Phase I.
In a memo to the Town Clerk dated May 26 1976 he listed 15 items of
planning and design, which he claimed failed to comply with normally
accepted standards of practice, the requirements of the Public Health
Act, or the Grade II Building By-Laws. Noting that it was too late to
do anything about Phase I, he included the following points in his list:
"2. The layout of the whole shceme lacks essential amenities and is
bad in principle. For example, no open spaces or recreation gardens
are provided for and the whole area will be a mass of buildings
reminiscent of overcrowded camps. The only open spaces provided for
are mainly secondary murram roads, which are themselves a danger
to health because of dust from speeding motor vehicles.....
3. Dwellings, latrines, baths and kitchens are planned on a back to
back fashion, making it impossible for efficient through or cross
ventilation (contrary to By-law 14 of Grade II by-laws of the
Building Code). If the purpose of this scheme is to substitute
for slums and shanties, thus improving peoples' health, the scheme
as constructed or envisaged will defeat that purpose. Such a com-
pact mass of buildings with hardly any space for circulation of air
and back to back dwellings will be the source of air borne,
infectious diseases. Vermin infestations will easily spread to
whole blocks from a focus and will be very difficult to deal with
[his emphasis].....
6. The general principle of providing means of inspection at all
points of change of direction, junctions and change of levels of
drainage is not complied with Rule 35 of the Public Health (Drainage
and Latrine Rules) [sic].....
13. There is no indiation of water storage facilities for other
purposes. The water supply will be totally inadequate for showers,
kitchens, washing of clothes, etc. Should water pressure go faulty,
the whole village will be denied of water supply. This will lead
to indiscriminate defecation in the yards, and dysentries, typhoid
and fly nuisance will be the order of the day."(28)
He concluded by making the following general comment:
"This scheme as envisaged will provide unsuitable and unfit dwellings
which will be dangerous to the health of the residents and to the
city generally; such dwellings will encourage air-borne, insect-
borne diarrhea and other enteric diseases, social and stress
diseases.
It will not be a surprise to public health and social workers
if the dwellings become hovels of crime and other public vices.
It is the duty of the Council as a public health authority to
prevent or remedy danger to health from unsuitable dwellings re.
Section 117 of the Public Health Act which states
'it shall be the duty of every health authority to take all
lawful, necessary and reasonable practicable measures for
preventing or causing to be prevented or remedied all conditions
liable to be injurious or dangerous to'health arising from the
erection or occupationof unhealthy dwellings or premises, or
the erection of dwellings or premises on unhealthy sites or on
sites of insufficient extent, or from overcrowding, or from the
construction, condition or manner of use of any factory or trade
premises, and to take proceedings against any person causing or
responsible for the continuance of any such conditions.'"(29)
He reiterated nearly all these comments on December 4 1976 in a
memo to the Town Clerk, dealing with the design of Phases II and III of
the project. At this time, the consultant was instructed by the Town
Clerk to stop work until further notice. Draft tender documents for
Phase II had by this time been sent to the IBRD and the National Housing
Corporation for approval. The final resolution of the standards con-
flict occurred after Phase I had been occupied and is discussed in the
next section. Preliminary design work on Phase III had been completed
the previous June.
With the completion of Phase I on November 20 1976 the contractor
handed over the keys for the core units to DPD. Table 4.4 summarizes
the numbers and types of plots actually prepared in Phase I.
The conclusion of this stage of the Dandora project was accompanied
by the dramatic resignation of the Town Clerk:
"When he finally left his job as Nairobi's town clerk, Mr. John
Mbogua submitted a confidential report to the city council which
has since become a talking point both inside and outside city
hall. Mbogua minced no words in his criticism of councillors and
officers of the council, accusing councillors of running up huge
debts with the council which they refused to pay and of using their
positions to acquire properties and businesses in the city. He
castigated some officers for colluding with the councillors in
their corruption and warned that unless the whole situation was
rectified the city was heading for bankruptcy and worse."(30)
His departure robbed Dandora of one of its staunchest supporters.
It was the Town Clerk who moved the project forward despite the oppo-
sition of his peers, the other Chief Officers of the Council. His
resignation came only a few weeks after the resignation of the Mayor
herself, the daughter of President Kenyatta. In a project as politi-
cally sensitive as Dandora, it was important to have the ear of the
President, who had been known to halt construction pf previous low
income housing schemes if he thought there were of too low a standard. 5
And so it was that as Phase I of Dandora was about to be occupied, the
project was without two vital sources of political and administrative
support. The commitment of the new Mayor and the new Town Clerk to the
project had yet to be tested.
Project Occupation: November 1976-Present
Immediately after the completion of Phase I, allottees were given
possession of their plots. However, without official City Council
approval of Phase I, DPD could not issue the standard house plans which
the allottees were required to use in building their dwellings. Neither
could DPD build the demonstration houses which were scheduled to be
built on seventeen plots. The debate on standards during the project
implementation stage had delayed the formal approval of Phase I by the
City Council. On January 20 1977 a joint meeting of the Dandora Project
Committee and the Works and Town Planning Committee "accepted" the plans
for the first Phase on the grounds that it was too late to make any
amendments. This "acceptance" gave DPD the authority to issue standard
house designs to allottees who had only been able to construct tempor-
ary dwellings since November 1976. By March nearly two hundred Option A
plots with the minimum wet core were occupied. Allottees on these plots
had resorted to constructing make-shift shelters, allowing them to at
least occupy the plots until such a time as they had finished their
approved dwelling. The presence of hastily and cheaply built shelters
reminiscent of those found in Nairobi's squatter areas disturbed members
of the Council who feared that Dandora was turning into a planned slum.
The new Town Clerk wrote letters to all the plot holders involved
instructing them to demolish them by the end of March 1977. This created
a new controversy which was resolved by compromise: permission to main-
tain the "site offices" until the expiration of the house consolidation
period, 18 months after signing the plot agreement.
The focus of the standards debate shifted from Phase I to Phases II
and III. The design consultants rebutted the comments of the Medical
Officer of Health point by point.(31) In cases where the criticism
warranted the proposal of alternative designs, these were suggested
together with the implications in terms of time and money. The total
cost of rectifying all the problems diagnosed by the Medical Officer
and his colleagues was estimated to be Ksh 27.6 ($2.3) million or
Ksh 5520 ($662) per plot.
After four months of discussion involving Council officers, Council
members, government officials and representatives from the IBRD, a
compromise solution was reached in April 1977. Only the standards
affecting the sewer system were changed. The location of the sewer
mains in relation to the core units was changed to provide a larger
way-leave, thereby affording easier access for maintenance purposes.
The core units, originally grouped in fours with two shared walls, were
split into pairs with one shared wall. (Refer to Figure 4.4).
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Figure 4.4 Proposed Wet Core Servicing Layout: Phase II (n.t.s.)
The estimated extra cost of these changes for Phases II and III was
Ksh 3,800,000 ($456,000) or Ksh 760 ($92) per plot. It was agreed that
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the Kenyan Government would pay for the cost of the extra works and the
IBRD would pay for the extra fees to the design consultants out of the
physical contingency fund. The consultants had to redo the engineering
layout for the 2,800 plots in Phase II. It was also agreed that the
extra costs would not be passed on to the allottee but would be absorbed
by the Government. With the standards issue resolved, the consultants
were instructed by the Town Clerk to resume work in accordance with the
original brief, now modified with respect to the sewer system.(32) The
remaining 5,000 plots were one year behind schedule.
Further aggravation between the City Council and the Central
Government was created when the Ministry of Local Government announced
at the end of June 1977 that it had appointed a team of four inspectors:
"' to conduct extraordinary inspections and examinations of the
accounts and records' of the council. It would also conduct inves-
tigations, research and inquiries into the general administration
and financial management of the council."(33)
Not the least of the MLG's stated concerns was the situation of
the City's housing supply system. One observer in Nairobi was moved
to say:
"As far as city housing is concerned, Nairobi residents have long
ago given up hoping that enough city housing schemes will go up to
cope sufficiently with the fast rising population of Nairobi.
When the schemes are implemented, the machinery for allocating the
available houses has been riddled with corruption. Influential
personalities, some owning or renting city council houses and flats
already, somehow always manage to add to their comforts when allo-
cations of city council housing is done. The low-income residents
for whom the housing schemes are meant, often find themselves with
no more than frustration to show for their efforts to better
living conditions. "(34)
To what extent the probe was motivated by factors other than a
desire on the part of the MLG for "good government" will be debated
for some time to come. In actual fact, the probe never did occur but
Table 4.4
Actual Plot Types Developed in Phase I
A. Residential Plots loom2 120m2 140m2 160m2 Total
Allocated
Option A 237 241 193 20 691
Option B 95 72 75 21 263
Total 332 313 268 41 954
Sold
Option C(l) -- 4 4 46 54
Demonstration plots (2) 12 2 3 -- 17
Demonstration houses(3) -- - 1 4
Total 12 9 7 47 95
B. Non-residential Plots
Temporary (unnumbered)
kiosks(4) 15
building materials lots(5) 15
Permanent
day care(6) 3
kiosks(6) 6
primary school(7) 1
market (8) 2
(1) Sold @ Ksh 28,000 each
(2) Not built, finally allocated to participants
(3) Built but not sold or allocated
(4) Located on public land within residential area
(5) Located adjacent to residential area
(6) Numbered plots zoned for non-residential use within residential
area, to be allocated by Commissioner of Lands, not Nairobi City
Council
(7) Construction of school started but temporarily abandoned by con-
tractor
(8) Construction not yet started
it did induce sufficient paranoia amongst officers of DPD to prevent
this researcher from getting a close look at the records and operations
of the Department during field work carried out in July and August of
1977. All council officers were under orders not to
"divulge any information requested whether officially or unof-
ficially to the inspectors who have been appointed by the Ministry
of Local Governments."(35)
Meanwhile, allottees were pressing on with the construction of
their dwellings. By December 1977 one half of the plots were occupied
and the high standards and pace of house construction surprised even the
most optimistic observer of the project. A detailed description of
Dandora Phase I is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Dandora Phase I:
One Year After Occupation
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the state of Dandora Phase I
twelve months after its occupation by project participants. A number of
performance indicators are given which measure the success of the pro-
ject as a comprehensive community development for low-income urban
residents. Among the different variables measured are: actual costs
versus estimated costs; actual "target income" group served versus the
estimated one; rate of defaults on payments; rate and quality of ho
consolidating;number of jobs created; rate of plot turnover; and the
morale of members of DPD.
It would be unwise to make definitive judgments about a community
development that is only one year old. However, several clear trends
have emerged and it is these that we wish to point out.
Plot Development Costs
When the preparation of Phase I plots was completed, DPD established
what the actual plot development costs (exclusive of material loans)
were for each size and type of plot allocated to the low-income groups.
Table 5.1 compares these actual costs reported in April 1977 with the
estimates made at the time of appraisal in April of 1975. It is evident
that it was the smaller Option A plots which incurred the largest
increases. These plots of 100 and 120 square meters made up 48% of
the total Phase I development.
Table 5.1
Cost of Plot Preparation Charged to Allottee (Ksh)
(exclusive of material loan)
Cost Monthly Charge3
area(m ) estimated1 actual2 estimated actual2 % increase
Option A 100 4,800 8,838 37 68 83
120 5,200 9,701 40 75 87
140 6,750 10,544 52 82 58
Option R 100 9,550 15,542 83 135 63
120 10,000 16,625 87 145 66
140 10,350 17,259 90 150 66
1. IBRD, Appraisal of a Site and Service Project, Kenya (607a-KE),
Washington, D.C., April 1975, p.19.
2. NCC, Strategies for Housing the Lower Income Groups in the
Dandora Communicy Development Project, Nairobi, May 1977, p.1 7 .
3. Based on 8.5% interest over 30 years for Options A and B
respectively.
It is possible that inflation of building costs has contributed to
these cost overruns. However, Table 5.2 shows that at the time of
construction between October 1975 and November 1976 the Nairobi Building
Cost indices for both residential and non-residential construction rose
only 10 per cent. Moreover, the original estimates included a contin-
gency sum of 12% for cost increases. It is more likely that the final
rush to prepare a project submission in the early months of 1974
resulted in poor cost estimates.
Another factor contributing to increased plot development costs was
the last minute switch to the prefabricated concrete panel system used
to construct the core units. The attendant cost increases were created
for a number of reasons. First, the building technology -- a patented
system marketed by the local franchise of a multi-national construction
company -- was more expensive per square meter than conventional con-
94
Table 5.2
Building Cost Index
Date Residential Non-Residential
January 1973 100 100
January 1974 115 115
January 1975 148 165
October 1975 163 178
January 1976 174 186
November 1976 182 200
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Nairobi
crete block wall construction. Second, the project was one third the
size required to cover the cost of setting up the site factory used to
produce the precast concrete components. A spokesman for the contractor
said in an interview that a minimum of 25,000 square meters of plinth
area (gross floor area) was the minimum size project that would justify
setting up the precasting plant. Dandora's plinth area was about 8,000
square meters. Third, ten to fifteen per cent of the panels had to be
discarded because of damage caused by mishandling. The mishandling
occurred because the sub-contractor, in a desire to demonstrate the
labor intensive potential of the system, used manual labor to maneuver
components around the site. The panels, measuring up to 100mm by 900mm
by 3050mm, and weighing an average of 260 kgs (one quarter ton) were
simply too awkward to handle manually. Fourth, the manual process of
pouring the aerated concrete into the panel forms caused uneven distri-
bution of the air bubbles throughout the concrete. When the panels
were cured, surface cracks appeared. As a result the sub-contractor was
required to plaster the panels both inside and out with cement finish.
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This effectively defeated the purpose of using the system in the first
place. Fifth, the panels were not designed with the necessary holes
and edge conditions to accommodate door and window frames or the passage
of water pipes. The alterations of the panels, once erected, to receive
these details required the same amount of labor, if not more, than the
concrete block system originally proposed. Lastly, the production of
panels had to be slowed down because the erection of the core units
outpaced the installation of infrastructure. As a result, the factory
was operating at below capacity most of the time, with consequent
additional diseconomies. Because of the nature of the building contract
for the core units, the sub-contractor was forced to absorb many of
the extra costs. However, it is certain that some of these extras were
passed on to the DPD and then to the plot allottees through the use of
funds reserved for physical contingencies which would otherwise have
remained unused.
A more important source of cost increases for the smaller Option A
plots was the failure of attempts to provide a cross-subsidy from the
more expensive plots. Two approaches to cross-subsidy were tried in
Dandora Phase I. The first approach involved the construction of 17
demonstration houses which were to be sold on the open market. The
profits realized were to be used to subsidize Option A units on the 100
and 120m2 plots. The delay in approving the standard house designs
prevented their construction before allottees started their own dwellings.
Th'refore the program was cancelled.
The resultant loss of cross-subsidy can be estimated as follows:
Seventeen houses with an average of four rooms each were to be con-
structed at a total cost of approximately Ksh 250,000. Rent levels of
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Ksh 150 per month per room imply a market value of Ksh 72,000 per plot
assuming a discount rate of 10%. The resultant profits of Ksh 57,300
per sale could have reduced the chargeable costs of 478 Option A plots
by Ksh 2,000. This would have reduced the monthly payments on the
subsidized plots by Ksh 16 per allottee. The second approach involved
selling the 54 Option C plots on the open market. This was done and
profits on the order of Ksh 7,000 per sale were realized. In principle
the income of Ksh 378,000 was to be used to offset the plot development
costs of 478 Option A plots by the amount of Ksh 790 each. This was not
done because the net effect of lowering monthly payments on these plots
by Ksh 7 each was considered "insignificant."(1) Thus an attempt to
provide cross-subsidy by programming a minimal level of economic mix
proved to be abortive. Increased plot development costs translated
into increased monthly plot charges for plot allottees.
Monthly Plot Charges
Table 5.3 combines the monthly repayment for lot preparation with the
other housing services, such as utilities and the materials loan. A
comparison of charges for each plot size by plot option shows actual
prices running 48-58% greater than estimated prices. Note that the
materials loan is optional and where an allottee decides against using
it, his monthly bill for housing services would be 48-72% greater than
estimated. With a full materials loan, the increase ranges from 61-88%.
There are two reasons for this increase, in addition to underestimation
of lot preparation costs. First, the maximum size of the optional
materials loan was increased by 20% to cover the effects of inflation.
This had the effect of increasing monthly charges by Ksh 5 to Ksh 10 per
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Table 5.3
Dandora Phase I Pricing of Housing Services (Ksh per month)
Option A (65% of all plots)
loOm 2 120m 140m
2
Option B (30% of all plots)
loom2 120m 140m
I est. act. I est. act. est.- act., est. act. I est. act. est. act.
__ __ 
_ I 
___1 .1 95 .1% of total lots 20.5 23.5 24 23.9 20.5 19.7 9.5 9.4 11 7.1 9-5 7.4
lot preparation 37 68 40 75 52 82 83 135 87 145 90 150
risk reserve (5%) 2 4 2 4 3 4 4 7 4 7 5 8
land rent 4 8 9 5 1 4 8 4 9 5 11
lot mortgage 43 80 46 88 60 97 91 150 95 161 100 169
2rates 6 4 7 5 8 6 6 4 7 5 8 6
utilities 24 40 24 52 i 24 52 24 40 24 52 24 52
lot mortgage and utilities 73 124 77 145 92 155 121 194 126 218 132 227
Buildingraterials minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
loan 3 maximum 54 65 54 65 54 65 21 25 21 25 21 25
Total Monthly Price
minimum
maximum
5minimum
Required income
maximum
% increase of actual minimum
over estimate maximummaximum---
73 124 77 145 92 155 121 195 120 218 132 227
127 189 131 210 146 220 142 219 141 243 153 252
292 496 308 580 368 620 484 780 480 880 528 728
508 756 524 840 584 880 568 876 564 972 612 1008
48 60 51 54 72 65
69 88 68 61 83 76
2
Ksh 90 per 100m2 per year
Ksh 48 per l00m per year
Loan size up 20% over appraisal, same terms - 8 1/2% over 20, 30 yrs.
Also maximum for Option A until year 5.
Assuming housing costs 25% of monthly income.
plot. Second, the monthly charge of Ksh 24 for utilities exclusive of
electricity was heavily underestimated. A second approximation is
given for a loom2 plot, under the following assumptions:
1) water consumption of 100 liters per person per day
2) a maximum of four rooms per plot with a maximum of three
people per room
3) a standing charge of Ksh 8 per month
4) meter rent of Ksh 2 per month
5) cost of metered water is Ksh 2.64 per 1,000 liters
Then the monthly water charge per plot is
8 + 2 + [(100x4x3x30) - 3,000] x 200 = 971000=
When added to standing charges for sewerage disposal and trash
collection of Ksh 8 and Ksh 4.50 respectively, the total utility bill
comes to Ksh 110. In Table 5.3 we assume that the occupants will
exercise extreme restraint and that total utilities will not exceed
2 2
Ksh 40 (Ksh52) for the loom (120,140m ) plots.
The significance of these cost increases becomes apparent when one
considers that plots were allocated on the basis of allottees having
incomes defined as a function of the estimated monthly plot costs.
Figure 5.1 shows the income distribution curve for Nairobi. The inten-
ded "target" income group fell between Ksh 280 and Ksh 650 per month and
is identified as reaching down to the lowest 20% percentile. The actual
monthly costs suggest that minimum and maximum income levels should be
from Ksh 750 to Ksh 1000 if full advantage of the materials loan
scheme is to be taken. This redefined income range extends from the
64th percentile "down" to the 44th percentile. If allottees do in fact
come from the intended "target" income group, they must be experiencing
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Figure 5-1 Nairobi Household Income Distribution
Sources: Tabtes 3.1, 5.3 Centile
100
6000
intense financial hardship. An allottee who had applied for the largest
Option B plot with full materials loan (Ksh 153 p.m.) will find he can
only afford an Option A plot without a materials loan (Ksh 155 p.m.).
Under such conditions, we should expect massive defaulting and/or
clandestine plot transfers to wealthier people. Similarly there ought
to be rather desperate attempts to obtain financing to permit the rapid
construction of homes for subletting. The evidence to date indicates
that defaulting is minimal. As of June 1977 only 16 allottees were
evicted for non-payment of monthly charges. Moreover, fewer than 6
percent were 3 or more months behind in their payments. While politi-
cal considerations have made DPD reluctant to evict plot occupants who
entered the scheme by misrepresenting their actual wealth and income
there is no reason to believe it would not evict occupants who default.
The evidence for this lies in the fact that the excess demand for
plots, including the demand by the rich, give no incentive to DPD to
permit non-paying allottees to remain in the scheme. One can therefore
infer that the low rate of default is an accurate reflection of the
relative solvency of the project participants. The question of clan-
destine transfers, sources of capital, and subletting will be taken up
below in the section entitled "Plot Ownership".
House Consolidation
Table 5.4 illustrates the extent to which low income plots had been
occupied and houses built as of December 1977. Option A plots have only
a wet core consisting of a toilet and a shower. Option B plots have a
wet core, a closet and a kitchen with running water and a chimney flue.
This fact helps explain why 84% of B plots were occupied whereas only
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39% of A plots were occupied: allottees on B plots were able to move
into the kitchen pending construction of another habitable room. This
fact also explains why only 2% of B plots had temporary shelters whereas
12% of A plots had them. Construction of a house had started on just
over three quarters of both A and B plots. Construction of at least
two rooms -- the minimum which had been required for Option A -- was
completed on 38% of A plots. Construction of at least a single room --
the minimum required for Option B -- had been completed on 45% of B
plots. A survey of the occupied plots taken in December 1977 revealed
that the population of Dandora Phase I was about 3,250 people.
Table 5.4
House Consolidation by Plot Option
(December 1977)
Option A Option B Total
Plots Plots Plots
no. % no. % no. %
Plots occupied 271 39 221 84 492 52
Construction of a
temporary shelter 87 13 4 2 91 10
Construction commenced 525 76 211 80 736 77
Construction completed to
minimum approved level 225 33 120 45 345 36
Source: MEDIS, 3, Tables 11/2, 11/3, 11/5 (100% samples)
Note: Percentages cannot be added
With 492 plots occupied, this translates into a plot occupancy rate of
6.6 people per plot. In the absence of an accurate count of completed
rooms, a room occupancy rate cannot be estimated.
Of the 10 'types of house plans prepared by DPD Technical Section,
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those with the maximum number of rooms were preferred by the allottees.
Technical assistance was favorably reviewed by allottees. Visits to
plots by the staff of the Technical Section were frequent and increased
in frequency if construction problems arose.
All respondents in a sample questionnaire administered to 9% of the
project's allottees by the Monitoring and Evaluation Study (MES) built
their houses out of dressed stone or concrete block.(2) All interior
wall finishes consisted of either plaster or plaster and paint. Over
96 percent of all rooms had steel casement windows, while less than 3
percent used wooden window frames. All allottees in the sample used
stone foundation and a cement floor finish. No statistics are avail-
able on the frequency of use of roofing materials, but visual observation
by the MES suggested it was similarly constrained to either galvanized
covered iron sheeting or corrugated asbestos sheeting. A small number
of houses had the more expensive mangalore tile roof. In almost all
cases the use of materials conformed to the specifications of the
approved type designs which allottees were required to follow.
Both the speed of consolidation and the quality of building con-
struction surprised the project managers. These two factors, more than
any others, have caused public opinion to change dramatically. Appar-
ently Dandora has renewed public faith in sites and services which do
not have to look like slums. This sudden reversal in public sentiment
has occurred in direct response to the visual image presented by Dandora.
Three methods of house construction were observed. Three fifths of the
questionnaire sample population used the owner/builder method. Under
this method the owners "supervised and participated as skilled or
unskilled laborers, employed other laborers and purchased materials
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themselves."(3) The questionnaire revealed that an average of 9
laborers were employed per plot, of whom 2 were masons and 1 was a
carpenter. Four-fifths of the unpaid work force in the sample were
members of the owner-builders family. More than half of these only
worked 2 or 3 times a week. Ninety percent of the allottees in the
sample worked 2 to 3 times a week, or less frequently, in any capacity.
Twenty one percent of the sample employed a contractor to carry out
the work. However, none handed over all the responsibility. All but
one owner purchased materials. The contractors supplied the labor and
supervision. At the time of the survey, rooms had been built by
building groups organized to provide a form of mutual aid. This method
used less labor per plot than either of the other two methods, but more
of the labor was unpaid (refer to Table 5.5). It is important to note
that only 22% of the labor contributing to the building of Phase I was
self-help (unpaid) labor. This relatively low figure explains in part
why the contractor method of construction is not more expensive than
the other two methods. That is, the small element of unpaid labor
implies a low level of financial cost savings among those construction
methods which use self help labor when compared with the contractor
method.
A comparison of labor and materials costs for the three methods is
given in Table 5.6. The mean construction period per room was about
three weeks for all methods. No data is available on the mean con-
struction period per house.
Allottees, all of whom were automatically eligible for a materials
loan, were taking full advantage of the credit program. With two-thirds
of the stipulated housing consolidation period over in December 1977,
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Table 5.5
Laborers Per Plot by Building Method
Method Unpaid Paid Total
Building Group 2.4 3.6 6.0
Contractor 0.4 7.1 7.5
Owner-builder 2.1 6.7 8.8
Source: MEDIS 3, p.45.
58 percent of the full loan amount had been disbursed.
The size of the loan amount, Ksh 2,880 per room, corresponded
almost exactly with the mean materials cost per room as reported in the
sample survey (refer to Table 5.6). Since the loans only covered the
purchase of materials and since 78% of the labor force was paid, allot-
tees did require additional sources of cash to build their homes. The
MES reports that:
"It is apparent that the amount of capital mobilized for house
construction exceeds that available through the loan program
by more than double."(4)
Table 5.6
Construction Costs Per Room
Labor Materials Total
Method (Ksh) (Ksh) (Ksh)
Building Group 866 3,091 3,957
Contractor 987 2,551 3,539
Owner-builder 1,171 2,740 3,911
Source: MEDIS 3, Tables 11/56, 11/57, and 11/58
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When surveyed, the sample population claimed to have used savings
averaging Ksh 5352 ($642) per plot. Thirty-two percent claimed to have
received financial assistance from relatives averaging Ksh 1350 ($162)
per plot. Other sources accounted for another Ksh 675 ($81). Reports
in the international press allege that:
"an underground capital market has sprung up to finance the building
with a flood of money from the rural areas to support (and eventu-
ally share the gain of) the lucky relative whose two-roomed council
house envisaged by the planners has quickly become a six-room
lodging house."(5)
The implications of this trend are discussed in Chapter 6.
Plot Utilization
Data from the MES questionnaire survey indicated that 36% of the sample
population sublet one or more rooms on their plots. Since the sample
excluded plots which were not owner-occupied and which had not completed
the minimum number of roomconstruction, this figure is probably low for
the project as a whole. The survey revealed a mean monthly rent of Ksh
153 ($18.36) per room. With "rent propensities" in the order of 35% of
the monthly income in Nairobi, as discussed in Chapter 3, it is likely
that the rental market is affordable only by those households earning
at least Ksh 440 ($53) per month -- that is, those in the 39th percen-
tile and higher. The supply of rental accommodation in Dandora does
not appear to be serving the needs of the lowest 20 percent of Nairobi's
income distribution, the intended beneficiaries of the permissive sub-
letting policy. The problem of high rents is exacerbated by the loca-
tion of the project, eleven kilometers from the City center. The
round trip bus fare is Ksh 2.80 ($0.28), double that estimated in 1975.
This implies a monthly transportation bill of Ksh 67 ($8.04) to enable
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one wage earner per household to travel to and from work six days a
week.
Plot Ownership
There is evidence that plots have begun to change hands without the
required authority of DPD. It appears that many of the new owners,
an estimated 8 to 10 percent of Phase I, purchased the plots in good
faith. In at least one instance, the sale was discovered when the new
owner visited DPD to learn what government assistance he might receive
to develop his plot. When it was discovered he was not one of the
original allottees, the Project Manager resolved to set an example by
widely publicizing his eviction. When he brought the case before the
Project Committee, the latter successfully avoided taking any action.
Excuses were made about not having sufficient information. Neverthe-
less, the story did appear in the newspapers. Within a few days, the
Project Manager had received upward of 80 calls from other new owners
who were worried about possible eviction. They were concerned that the
Project Department would take legal action to repossess the plots.
However, for political reasons, no action was taken. It has been
alleged by informed sources in Nairobi that the new owners of plots are
friends of the members of the Project Committee.
Further unconfirmed reports in the news suggest that to get around
the problem of detection by DPD, there was created:
"a kind of underground legal system whereby some plots have been
sold to speculators, while the original owner (not allowed to sell
for five years by NCC) remains the 'legal' owner only nominally."( 6 )
Two other trends have also been observed with respect to plot
ownership. It appears that plots from which original allottees have
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been evicted have not been allocated to people on the approved waiting
list. In addition, the Project Manager has alleged that people on the
waiting list for plots in Phases II and III are being bought out by
middle class interests.(7) The demand for plots in Dandora appears to
be sufficiently high to warrant selling plots which have not even been
created. An examination of the investment potential of a plot developed
with four habitable rooms, the maximum permitted with single story
construction, is sufficient to illustrate why the demand is so high.
Table 5.7 illustrates the calculation of the "internal rate of return"
of an investment in a typical Option B plot 140 square meters in area,
developed with four rooms, at a total cost of Ksh 14,400. The plot
owner is eligible for a materials loan of Ksh 2880 and it is assumed he
borrows the difference of Ksh 11,520 from a commercial bank at 10%
interest repayable over three years. It is also assumed that the rooms
are built within three months of allocation and rented out at an initial
rent of Ksh 150 per month. Rents are assumed to increase at a rate of
10% per year for 12 years. Monthly payments are assumed to remain
constant at Ksh 252 per month and maintenance costs are assumed to be
zero. The internal rate of return of the investment is 100.8% over the
first 12 years. By the fourth year the owner collects over Ksh 6650
($786) per year. If this was his only income, he would automatically
be better off than 45 percent of Nairobi's population. The calculation
has assumed that the owner occupies the contractor-built kitchen, or
that it is shared by the occupants of the four rooms. In fact, it is
more probable that the owner will be an absentee landlord and sublet
the kitchen as well. In this case he will receive an additional Ksh 200
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per month in the first year because the kitchen has its own water supply
and chimney flue. If this extra revenue is taken into account in the
example given, the internal rate of return jumps to 687.4 per cent! The
example is not as farfetched as it sounds. An evaluation of Nairobi's
Kariobangi sites and services schemes undertaken in 1971 showed that
94 percent of all 723 plots were owned by absentee landlords.(8)
Moreover, the methodological assumption of the IRR calculation that all
interim profits accruing to the owner are reinvested at a rate equal
to the internal rate of return is capable of being satisfied by virtue
of the opportunities for further investment in the 5,000 plots in Phases
II and III.
Table 5.7
Cash Flow for Sample Plot Development (Ksh)
Commercial Net
Rental Payment Construction Cash
Year Income to DPD Loan Flow
1 5,400 3,024 4,632 -2,256
2 7,920 3,024 4,632 264
3 8,712 3,024 4,632 1,056
4 9,576 3,024 --- 6,552
5 10,536 3,024 7,512
6 11,592 3,024 --- 8,568
7 12,744 3,024 9,720
8 14,028 3,024 --- 11,004
9 15,432 3,024 --- 12,408
10 16,968 3,024 --- 13,944
11 18,672 3,024 --- 15,648
12 20,532 3,024 --- 17,508
Employment
To date no survey has been done on the amount of wage employment which
exists in and around the project. The lack of completed community and
commercial facilities in the central spine indicate that is is virtually
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non-existent.
Project Administration
The Project Manager's inability to persuade the Project Committee to
enforce the regulations governing plot ownership was another event in
a long list of episodes which culminated in his resignation in April
1978. The weak position in which he found himself had been exacerbated
by the political infighting which had occurred between the different
factions of the Kikuyu clan who dominated the City Council. Not being
a member of the most powerful faction closely allied with the
President, he was at a distinct~ disadvantage when disagreeing fwith:
actions of the City Council which ran counter to the IBRD agreement.
His resignation was not the only one. Since December 1977 the Deputy
Project Manager, the Project Architect/Planner, the Project Architect
and the Head of the Community Development Section have also resigned,
partly out of the frustration with the political intervention in the
operation of Dandora. Thus as Phase II approaches, the project admini-
stration will be lacking most of its experienced leadership.
There is also another important development which has contributed
to the decline in morale of the project team: the City Council has
resumed its "clean-up operations" of squatter areas in central Nairobi
in a manner which is contrary to the IBRD agreement. On at least six
different occasions between October 13 1977 and March 7 1978 the City
Council has used bulldozers to clear shanties, food crops and open-air
workshops from four different areas close to the city center. The
demolition was undertaken with little or no notice and none but a small
fraction of households has been offered alternative accommodation.(9 )
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IBRD reaction to the first of these incidents has been restrained and
has amounted to no more than a letter to the Nairobi Town Clerk advising
him of the violation.
Conclusion
By some measures Dandora Phase I is a resounding success. The centrally
organized preparation of 1,000 serviced plots was accomplished within
five months of the scheduled completion date. Six thousand allottees
were selected from double the number of applicants in less than three
months. Within one year of occupation, nearly forty percent of the
plots had been developed to the minimum required level. Moreover, the
work was of such a high standard it surprised even the project manage-
ment. The proportion of allottees who had defaulted on their plot and
material loans within the first six months was less than 2%. In fact,
as of June 1977 fewer than 6% of the allottees were more than 3 months
behind in their monthly payments. The materials loan and technical
assistance programs are working according to plan. Dandora had the
outward appearance of a booming low-income settlement on the periphery
of Nairobi.
By other measures, Dandora Phase I has fallen short of its goal as
a comprehensive community development for Nairobi's low-income groups.
Actual monthly plot charges are 50-90% higher than had been estimated
at the time of project appraisal. The monthly rental for a single room
in Dandora, estimated to be Ksh 153 in December 1977, is too high to be
affordable by households below the 39th percentile in the income distri-
bution curve. The amount of self help used in constructing dwellings
has fallen short of project planners' expectations. Overall unpaid or
111
self help labor constituted less than 22% of the total labor force used.
There is evidence to show that 10% of Phase I plots have already been
sold on the open market by the original allottees. The penetration of
the project by the middle and high income groups is expected to continue
since applicants on the waiting list for plots in the future phases of
the project have been known to sell their rights to such plots. The
construction of community facilities is 18 months behind schedule. As
of December 1977 there were but 15 temporary kiosks to cater for the
shopping needs of 4,000 residents. No permanent jobs had been created.
A decline in the morale of the Project Department, in part caused by
political intervention in the operation of the scheme, has contributed
to the resignation of no fewer than six top level managers.
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Chapter 6
Theory versus Practice
Introduction
It is clear that in practice many of the observed outcomes at Dandora
differed markedly from those predicted by the theory of sites and
services. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the interrelation-
ships between these outcomes. The analysis is done from the perspective
of a policy maker concerned with implementing a sites and services scheme
in the context of severe low-income housing shortage in a free-market
economy.
The shortcomings apparent in the Dandora project are of two different
kinds. First, there are those which stem from erroneous assumptions
about Nairobi's housing policy environment. These assumptions deal with
such factors as the priority of housing in the lives of Nairobi's
low-income population and the power of the market to re-allocate housing
once it had been allocated by the City Council. Second, there are weak-
nesses which stem from contradictions which are inherent in the sites and
services approach itself. These contradictions arise because the stra-
tegy attempts to achieve multiple and often mutually exclusive goals.
In some cases these conflicts were exacerbated by groups of actors in
the Prpject. From a policy perspective, these structural weaknesses
are considered more troublesome than the failure to understand or
114
acknowledge the nuances of Nairobi's housing problem. Whereas the latter
can be corrected with experience or renewed political will, the former
are endemic to the sites and services concept and will not disappear
with the marginal adjustments to the approach.
For this reason the analysis of Dandora presented here is organized
around the following five predominant contradictions: price versus
standards; subsidies versus replicability; self-help labor versus wage
employment; middle-income beneficiaries versus low-income beneficiaries;
and sponsor control versus participant freedom. For purposes of discus-
sion, each contradiction subsumes a number of related issues which are
dealt with in the analysis. There are, of course, linkages between the
contradictions. These linkages generate the complete "issue web"
confronting the policy maker.
Each of the five sectors of the issue web is described in the form
of a diagram which depicts the cause and effect relationships between the
variables contributing to the contradiction. Each diagram serves as a
preliminary sketch about causal hypotheses. For example, in Figure 6.1
an increase in the variable labeled "Required level of physical stan-
dards" is hypothesized to cause an increase in the variable entitled
"cost of labor and materials per plot." This causal relatiohship is
indicated by the arrow leading from the causal variable to the effected
variable. The "+" sign indicates that as the first variable increases
ceteris paribus, so does the second. A "-" would indicate that as one
variable increases ceteris paribus, the second one decreases. See, for
example, the relationship between the variable called "net subsidy for
low-income plot development" and "monthly price of housing services to
low-income allottees" in Figure 6.1. The "+" and "-" signs do not imply
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value judgments, but rather the direction of change in one variable as
a result of a change in a causal variable.
Housing Prices versus Housing Standards
One of the most prominent conflicts in the Dandora Project occurred
between the proponents of low housing prices at the expense of high
housing standards and those who argued for high standards at the expense
of low prices. Standards can be defined as:
"measures of the acceptability of housing at a given time
and place and in a given cultural, technological and
economic setting."(1)
The standards at issue at Dandora were those that dictated the quality
of the physical content of the project, that is the built form, open
space, movement systems and public services. Prices were measured in
terms of the monthly charges an allottee had to pay in return for the
housing services he received. The linkages between standards and prices
are illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 6.1. In simple terms, higher
physical standards dictated higher development costs. With a fixed
policy on financial subsidy, terms of repayment and user charges for
utilities, higher development costs per plot dictate higher monthly
prices. The link is a determinate one and forms the basis for calcu-
lating the monthly charges payable by the allottee.
The arguments in favor of higher standards included a humanitarian
concern for the health and welfare for the project participants, an
aversion to sanctioning a double standard for housing in Kenya's urban
areas (viz., one for the rich and one for the poor), fear of reprisals
from central Government if local Government did not strictly observe
established legal standards, a fear that Dandora would become another
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slum, lower maintenance costs on the project, and long-run economic
efficiency. The Medical Officer of Health was the leading proponent
of higher housing standards.
The major argument in favor of standards lower than established legal
norms was put forward by the IBRD and the technical officers of the
City Council. The argument was affordability. Given that the low-income
groups should pay for their housing but that the portion of their
monthly income devoted to it should not exceed twenty-five per cent,
every shilling increase in monthly payment necessitated a four shilling
increase in income. The increase in standards advocated by the Medical
Officer of Health would have added Ksh 5520 ($660) to the development
costs of every plot in Phases II and III. This would have increased the
monthly amortization payment of Type A allottees by Ksh 42 ($5.10) per
month. Affordability criteria would require minimum monthly incomes to
be Ksh 170 ($20.40) higher than was actually required. Given the income
distribution in Nairobi, this would have put the benefits of the scheme
beyond the range of anyone earning less than the median income (refer to
Figure 5.1). The Medical Officer of Health counterargued that govern-
ment subsidies should make up the difference in development costs
attributed to the increased standards. As it was, the Government
agreed to provide the subsidy needed to meet the additional cost of the
higher standard sewer system for Phases II and III.
The issue of standards was also raised when the building sub-contrac-
tor proposed to construct the core units with the prefabricated concrete
panel system. This time it was the technical officers in the City
Council and not the politicians who were responsible for the increase
in standards. Because of the conditions of the contract for the
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building works and the promotional nature of the sub-contractor's bid,
many of the extra costs were paid for by the sub-contractor. Thus, as
with the revised sewer designs, a form of net subsidy was used to pay
for the increased standards.
Before discussing the question of subsidies, an indirect consequence
of higher standards and prices should be noted. Where improved standards
are achieved through higher levels of technology, such standards may
reduce the opportunities for self-help construction. In Dandora an
early decision to provide water-borne sanitation instead of pit latrines
undoubtedly had this effect. Ironically, where higher standards lead to
higher prices, there may occur an increased need for self-help labor
to keep the financial cost of the whole venture within the range of
the low-income participants.
Finally, the problem of standards in Dandora had another impact on
costs and prices: the time required to settle the issue introduced a
delay of six months in the implementation of Phase I. It created the
twelve month delay currently experienced in Phases II and III. Infla-
tion, estimated at 12% per annum for civil works in 1976, accounts for
some of the increase in costs observed in Phase I (refer to Table 5.2).
The net result of all the direct and indirect impacts of the standards
issue will very likely put the price of the remaining 5,000 plots
altogether out of the range of the original participant population.
Subsidy versus Replicability
We observed in Chapter 5 that net subsidies, whether public or private,
provided one way to control the level of monthly housing prices in
Dandora. Such subsidies, however, only work at the expense of project
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replicability. That is, the greater the net subsidy provided to Dandora,
the greater the probability that the project could not be replicated at
other locations as part of a large scale sites and services program.
Public funds amounting to Ksh 2,800,000, required to pay for the higher
standards of sanitation in Phases II and III, could have paid for another
318 Option A plots at the original standard of sewerage disposal, given
the availability of other resource inputs (refer to Figure 6.2). the
private subsidy provided by the building sub-contractor would clearly
not have been forthcoming if Dandora had not been an experimental project
in which attempts were made to demonstrate the virtues of innovative,
if somewhat inappropriate, technology.
While net subsidies do reduce the potential replicability of a
project by absorbing funds which would otherwise be spent on extra plots,
they also result in lower monthly prices for those allottees who receive
subsidies. Since one objective of Dandora is to cater for the housing
needs of the low-income groups, the relative absence of net subsidy in
Dandora has compromised the achievement of this goal.
Cross-subsidy represented another way of reducing monthly prices of
at least some of the plots in Dandora. Two attempts to achieve a cross-
subsidy from the more expensive plots to the cheaper plots failed for
reasons cited in Chapter 5. It is instructive to examine what ratio of
expensive plots to cheap plots would have been required to generate the
cross-subsidy needed to bring the development costs of 478 Option A
plots down to the estimated level.
Table 5.1 indicates that actual plot development costs charged to
Option A allottees exceeded estimated costs by Ksh 4400 per plot. This
means that a total cost overrun of Ksh 2,103,000 was incurred on the 478
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subsidized plots. With a profit of Ksh 7000 made on the sale of one
Option C plot, it would have taken 300 such sales to reduce the actual
development costs charged to the A allottees down to the level of the
estimates quoted in Table 5.1.
This implies that an economic mix of 3 middle-income plots to every
5 low-income plots was required rather than the ratio of 1 to 9 provided
in the project. The combination of requirements for no net subsidy,
affordability by the low-income and standards such as used in Dandora
Phase I suggest that an economic mix in the order of 3 out of 8 or 37% is
required to generate the necessary cross-subsidy. Clearly a policy of
providing such a high proportion of middle-income plots runs counter to
the need to give priority to the housing needs of the low-income. If
replicability is to be achieved, standards need to be lowered and economic
mix has to be increased. However, this will only work to the extent
that lowering of standards and achieving higher economic mix among
project occupants are not in themselves mutually exclusive.
Figure 5.1 gives a dramatic illustration of how unaffordable the
project is, at least by the criteria established in the project pre-
paration stage. One wonders how it is that the rate of defaults is as
low as 2 per cent. There are a number of possible answers. First, it
is likely that many of the plots are not in the effective control of
the low-income groups. We have seen, in a number of cases, that plots
have been sold by the original allottees. It has also been surmised
that allottees are acting as "fronts" for wealthier plot developers. In
both cases, low-income allottees have either withdrawn from the scheme
altogether or are now tenants on their own plots. In both cases an
important stated objective of Dandora homeownership has been subverted.
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Second, it is possible that the permissive policy of subletting has
provided the low-incoke allottee who has already built his dwelling with
a source of rental income with which to offset the higher monthly charges.
Partial subletting was intended as a means of improving the lot of the
low-income groups in Dandora. However, the rent levels recorded in
December 1977 suggest that it is not the very low-income who are occupying
these rental units, as intended by the project planners.
A policy to permit subletting cannot therefore be justified on the
grounds that it provides housing to the poorest fifth of Nairobi's
population. That is, subletting is not contributing to the goal of
vertic'al equity so long as the rental and ownership market cater for the
same income group, i.e. those earning Ksh 600 per month or more.
Self-Help Labor versus Wage Employment.
This section deals with a complex web of issues that concern the genera-
tion of wage employment and the stimulation of self-help efforts at
community development (refer to Figure 6.3). Dandora, like many sites
and services schemes in Kenya, is notable for the lack of self-help
labor in dwelling construction. The project's allocation criteria
demanded that allottees have a stable income. This meant that most
allottees had regular employment and could not devote time during the
working day to build their houses. Lack of electricity for on-plot
lighting precluded construction at night. The opportunity costs for
self-help labor were too high, particularly for those better-off allot-
tees on Option B plots, to permit much accumulation of "sweat equity".
The Monitoring and Evaluation Study's sample revealed that 22% of the
labor force in Dandora Phase I was of the self-help variety. Table 5.6
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indicates that the cost of labor required for one room is about Ksh 1000.
If this labor cost represents 78% of the total value of labor contributed
to building one room, then the value of the self-help (unpaid) labor must
be Ksh 280. This amount represents less than 8% of the total value of
the room, including materials. The reluctance to use self-help labor
has permitted many artisans (fundis) and small contractors to take full
advantage of the demand for construction skills. The institutional
barriers, such as credit and bonding procedures which impose constraints
on African participation in large construction jobs associated with the
formal sector did not create similar obstacles for small scale "informal"f
operators. The latter, requiring little capital and having almost
non-existent overheads, were engaged by plot allottees who provided the
materials purchased with the materials loan.
No figures are available to indicate how much labor was provided by
people who migrated to Nairobi in direc-t response to the flurry of
demand for both skilled and unskilled construction labor. The reports
indicating substantial flows of money into the project from the rural
areas suggest that the income earning potential of Dandora was well
known to the rural kin of plot allottees. It is not unreasonable to
assume that a number of rural folk arrived on the project site in search
of employment and perhaps carrying Ksh 100 or more from an uncle or
cousin to be invested in a relative's plot. The flow of people and
capital from the countryside into Dandora is part of the rules of the
game in Kenya's mixed economy but it augers badly for the long-run
interregional economic equity of the country. In addition, the increased
population flow to the project region will increase demand for rental
accommodation in the project, forcing rents up even higher than they are
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now. Moreover, this induced influx of people in search of jobs, not
housing, may exacerbate the creation of spontaneous squatter settlements
in the city. It is unlikely that these people will return to the
countryside once housing construction is complete. Employment in the
construction sector at Dandora is at best a short-term phenomenon, given
that nearly forty percent of all plots had completed the minimum required
dwelling within twelve months of occupation.
Employment opportunities associated with the planned community facil-
ities and other forms of investment have not materialized. As of
December 1977, there were no significant sources of formal employment
for plot allottees and their families. Of fifteen temporary plots
reserved for the use of materials suppliers, only two had been occupied,
with consequent loss of employment opportunities. The construction of
the primary school, though begun, had not been completed. The construc-
tion of the health clinic had not been started because of disagreement
within the City Council on the issue of standards. The Medical Officer
was unhappy about using a type design which had been especially prepared
for Dandora but which had not been tested in practice. The new design
called for lower standards of accommodation and lower costs. There is
no evidence that any commercial or industrial investment has occurred to
date.
Allottees' attempts to create their own informal employment has been
hampered by the City Council's control of unlicensed trading. Efforts
to establish food kiosks on residential plots have been met with stiff
resistance from DPD. Recently, however, fifteen unnumbered plots have
been allocated to residents for purposes of setting up small food stands,
cum corner stores.
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Self-help is a straw man in Dandora. It cannot be said to have
detracted significantly from the supply of wage paid jobs associated
with house construction. In spite of this there is still a lack of new
and permanent job opportunities in the project area. This situation is
exacerbated by the project's location. As yet, casual labor does not have
the accessibility to employment centers needed to keep up the continuous
search for work. The lack of employment with opportunities for upward
mobility will not contribute to the stability of the community. Dandora
is already beginning to look like the dormitory suburb some of the
project planners feared it would become:
In light of the distance of this scheme from the city center,
and the number of persons expected to occupy the site, it must be
remembered that in effect another town is being built. All the
services and amenities of a town must be provided, if Dandora is
to become anything more than a 'bedroom community', from which
people flee in the mornings to their jobs and return in the
evenings."(2)
Middle Class Penetration of Dandora
One of the most persistent tendencies observed in sites and services
schemes is the propensity for the middle- and high-income groups to
gain control of the project despite Government controls to avoid this
phenomenon. Figure 6.4 illustrates the ways in which this can occur.
These mechanisms include the means by which the better-off in society
acquire control over land through the acquisition of plots. They can
also benefit from projects by controlling sources of capital and other
construction resources, including technical assistance. Dandora has
not escaped this tendency. In particular, the ownership of land has
already emerged as the leading issue despite efforts by the planners to
ensure that plots would be allocated to and retained by the low-income
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groups.
There is an important distinction among the ways in which plots fall
into the hands of the middle class. In the first instance, they purchase
plots on the open market under the conditions of willing seller, willing
buyer. In Dandora this is illegal until the fifth anniversary of
signing the lease agreement. The conditions of occupancy are designed
to eliminate sell-outs before the community has had a chance to consoli-
date. If an allottee wants to leave the project, he must sell the plot
back to DPD in return for compensation for improvements based on the cost
of materials and an imputed cost of labor. Secondly, the middle class can
gain control over plots.through fraudulent allocation either at the
beginning of the project or when a plot comes up for reallocation after
an allottee has been evicted by DPD. This is also illegal. However,
whereas fraudulent allocation involuntarily deprives the low-income
groups of plots, sale on the open market is a voluntary transaction. The
sale of 8-10% of plots in Phase I which had occurred by January 1978
suggests that the original allottees saw greater net benefits in selling
their plots than they did in occupying them. That is, they had a greater
need for the one-time cash payment than for Dandora's housing services.
The reasons for this may include project location too far from the allot-
tee's place of work, inability to raise sufficient funds to complete an
acceptable dwelling within the stipulated time and family needs which
take priority over investing in a permanent urban house. In this regard
reference should be made to the description in Chapter 3 of the patterns
of circular migration and the one family/two household arrangement which
militate against urban homeownership as a first priority amongst the
low-income. In other words, for at least 10% of Dandora's Phase I
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population there is a mismatch between user priorities and the kind of
housing services supplied by the project.
There are several other factors which conceivably accelerate the
market turnover of plots. A plot in Dandora is an extremely attractive
investment, as illustrated in Table 5.5, The clarity and security of
tenure granted the owner upon completion of an approved dwelling makes
the property still more attractive as an investment by reducing the risk
of losing possession of the plot. Finally, an allottee who has an
unstable income may have a high "discount" rate and hence he is willing
to sell his plot, even at a relatively low price. That is, he may value
the immediate but modest returns from the sale of his plot more highly
than the larger returns earned in the long run by subletting.
An examination of Figure 6.4.reveals that the efficacy of the pro-
cedure for evicting delihquent allottees may in fact exacerbate the
turnover of plots on the open market. If an allottee is unwilling or
unable to develop his plot within 18 months of occupation or to the
standard approved by DPD he may sell it quickly before DPD evicts him.
The market sale will give him a higher return than the compensation
offered by the Government for reasons outlined above.
A full explanation for 1he high rate of house consolidation on some
plots must await a more complete investigation by the Monitoring and
Evaluation Study. Undoubtedly, the high returns to subletting has
created one important incentive for rapid development. It is also
likely that the partial displacement of the low-income groups by the
middle-income groups accounts for this phenomenon. The middle-income,
by definition, command more resources with which to build houses and can
therefore be expected to build faster than their poorer brethren.
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From an operational point of view it becomes important to determine
why 23% of all plots show no signs of development (refer to Table 5.4).
An analysis of the financial and social situation of the owners of the
166 Option A plots and the 52 Option B plots on which no development has
occurred would help explain this phenomenon. One would not be surprised
to find that these plots are still in the hands of the original allottees
who were drawn from the intended "target" income group. Given the actual
costs of owning a plot in Dandora, they may now find themselves unable
to afford to develop it (refer to Table 5.3). Alternatively, the
undeveloped plots may be being held for purely speculative reasons.
The owners, whatever their income bracket, may hope to achieve capital
gains on the sale of their plots at a later date. In order to avoid
eviction by DPD the sales would have to take place within 18 months of
signing the lease agreement. This period of time would be long enough to
realize greater profits than those that could be earned by depositing
the monthly payments in a Post Office savings account earning 5% per
annum, a popular savings instrument among Kenya's low-income. A third
reason which may account for the absence of development on one quarter
of the plots may be the control exerted by the sponsors over the manner
in which the low-income can develop their plots. This factor is described
in the next section, which deals with the more general issue of sponsor
control versus participant freedom.
Sponsor Control versus Participant Freedom
The evolution of the design of Dandora as described in Chapter 4 clearly
shows the trend towards increasing sponsor control at the expense of the
initial desire for the participants' freedom of choice. Government
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authorities in Kenya and officials of the IBRD were anxious to avoid
the possibility of having the project slip out of their control and
becoming another ramshackle appendage to Nairobi, "the City in the
Sun". They did not want Dandora to repeat the failures of past sites
and services schemes which they saw as languishing in a state of semi-
consolidation. The desire to ensure rapid and high quality development
led to the adoption of policies which sought to reduce the number of ways
in which the project could get off the track. The "systems analytic"
view of this strategy would suggest that DPD was aware of Murphy's Law
("If anything can go wrong it will.") and they used Ashby's Law of
Requisite Variety ("The variety of a controlling system must be at least
as great as the variety of the system being controlled.") to minimize
its applicability.
This strategy of risk aversion was conceived not so much in terms of
increasing the complexity of the management system, but rather in terms
of reducing the variety of project components offered to the allottees.
It is likely that the net effect of these policies was to make it more
difficult for the low-income to build their houses. Indeed, the policies
may have made it more difficult for the low-income to survive at all
inside the project. Figure 6.5 illustrates the nature of the contra-
diction between administrative control and participant freedom to select
the means by which to build a house, earn a living, use his land and
choose his neighbors.
In the project formulation stage it was decided that the proposed
urbanization project must be large enough to have a demonstrable impact
on Nairobi's housing supply. Later, during the project preparation
stage, practical considerations of implementation dictated that the
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whole project should be located on one continuous site. Meeting both
constraints at once required selecting a site relatively far from the
city center and related employment opportunities. The peripheral site
did offer cost savings because land was cheaper than in more central
locations. However, transportation costs incurred in traveling between
work places in town and the project site had a countervailing effect on
affordability, as discussed earlier.
In an effort to control plot occupancy, development and capital
recovery, all plots were allocated to individuals as opposed to groups
of individuals. This limited the ability of the allottees to develop
patterns of communal land use. Moreover, allocating plots randomly
without regard to participants' preferences for neighbors further indivi-
dualized the nature of plot use and control. Assigning legal responsi-
bility for plot repayments to individuals eliminated the flexibility
often required to meet regular mortgage installments out of an irregular
flow of income. Insisting on payments at monthly intervals further
reduced the scope for coping with family emergencies of a kind that can
leave the head of a household temporarily "out of pocket".
To ensure control over land use in Dandora, the Council invoked a
number of municipal by-laws which banned unlicensed trading from the
site and prohibited commercial and industrial activity from residential
plots. This curtailment of "informal" employment undoubtedly had an
effect on household incomes in the project area. It is unlikely, however,
that the enforcement of these by-laws will continue for very long. In
the first place, the City Council does not have the police force neces-
sary to keep up the scrutiny required. In the second place, "informal
employment" provides one outlet for political unrest, a kind of steam
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valve to relieve pressure on the Government for additional services.
Dandora's planners prepared standard house designs for use by the
allottees. The plans specified the layout of the dwelling, the construc-
tion system and materials to be used. They were ostensibly prepared to
speed up the process of plot development. It was argued that since the
plans were already approved by the City Council they could be used
without the time consuming necessity of obtaining this approval for each
and every individual plan. Legally, plot holders did not have to use
such plans, but this fact was not widely known. The net result was the
specification of a quasi-compulsory style of house construction which
was not amenable to using large quantities of self-help labor. Since
financial credit from DPD was available only for materials, the low-
income-groups may not have been able to afford the KSH 1000 for labor
required to build each room. Recall that Dandora was designated a Grade
II Building zone in January 1975. Under this by-law, a relaxed standard
of house construction is permitted. For example, under the section
dealing with the construction of exterior walls it says:
"No walls shall be constructed to a lower standard than wattle or
timber adequately framed together and filled and covered with
mud. Such walls shall be capable of supporting the roof....:
Provided that the Council may specify the materials to be used
in constructing and finishing the walls."(3)(emphasis added)
It appears that the City Council granted the right to build to
relaxed standards amenable to self-help labor and then took it away by
preparing the type plans calling for, inter alia, walls made of concrete
block or dressed stone. Such action reveals the City's preference for
aesthetically pleasing "modern" development over more traditional and
affordable forms of housing for the low-income groups. The criterion
135
of minimal but improvable standards clearly does not apply to that part
of the development process most suitable for user participation: the
dwelling. This factor undoubtedly accounts in part for the low rate of
consolidation on the unoccupied plots, particularly the Option A plots
allocated to the poorer half of the "target" group.
Initially the Council took a similarly narrow view of the issue
concerning the construction of temporary shelters on plots. The
Monitoring and Evaluation Study has shown how the rate of plot consolida-
tion increases with plot occupation.(4) Plot occupation eliminates the
need for alternative rental accommodation, freeing money that can be
used in building the "approved" dwelling. It also reduces the time and
expense involved in traveling to and from the plot while construction
is underway. Temporary shelters also become storage areas for construc-
tion materials and tools. On Option A plots, with core units consisting
of a toilet and shower, a temporary shelter is a necessity if the allot-
tee wants to occupy the site prior to finishing his dwelling. The
outcome of the debate, described briefly in Chapter 4, resulted in a
compromise permitting allottees to use temporary shelters until the
expiration of the 18 month construction period. Nevertheless, the number
of such "site offices" has declined since the Council first ordered the
buildings demolished in March 1977. The low rate of house consolidation
observed on unoccupied Option A plots may, in part, be explained by this
decline.
The Nairobi City Council's paramount desire to control the quality
of the physical environment in Dandora resulted in the adoption of
uniformly high standards of infrastructure. Whereas the Grade II by-law
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permits pit latrines, DPD adopted water-borne sewerage. In the one case
where DPD adopted a standard of secondary road construction below the
"full adoptive standards" normally required by the Council, the Highways
Section refused to take them over for maintenance.(5) The attitude of
the City Council in this matter hardly conveys an impression of commit-
ment to minimal but improvable standards in the interests of providing
affordable housing to the low-income groups.
The subjugation of Dandora to all the formal development regulations
of the Nairobi City Council effectively removed decisions concerning
dwelling construction from the hands of the project participants. From
a bureaucratic perspective Dandora Phase I resembles a conventional
public housing project for which the City engaged one contractor for
each plot. Each contractor was required to build a "permanent" dwelling
according to a pre-selected and approved plan within 18 months. In
return the contractor received leasehold title to the land on which the
dwelling was built.
Conclusions
The analysis of the observed outcomes at Dandora has exposed some of
the major inherent contradictions which caused the project to fall short
of its goals. It has also revealed some of the flaws in Nairobi's
housing policy environment which militate against a successful low-
income housing policy. The net effect of both sets of impediments was
the transformation of a multi-sectoral community development project
characterized by self-help and home ownership into a rental housing
scheme coming increasingly under the control of the middle class. In
this aense, the real impact of the strategy of sites and services as
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depicted by Dandora has much in common with Kenya's conventional public
housing program. Aside from the initial income redistribution effect
of allocating plots to the low-income group, the policy must be seen as
one having greater continuity with past housing policies and less as
one of a radical new attempt to help Kenya's urban poor.
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Chapter 7
Recommendations and Conclusions
Introduction
This final chapter describes the extent to which Dandora possesses the
advantages and disadvantages of sites and services projects outlined
in Chapter 2. Some implications of the Dandora experience for the fu-
ture of the national program of sites and services are discussed. The
low priority accorded to homeownership by the urban poor as indicated by
fragmentary evidence of illegal plot turnovers suggests that Dandora
is having an unanticipated side effect on the redistribution of income
within the city's population. Some of the consequences of this pheno-
menon are discussed. Proposals for making serviced sites more afford-
able by the low-income groups are put forward and the consequences of
these recommendations for income distribution are outlined. Finally,
an alternative strategy of settlement upgrading is advocated as a way
of extending the benefits of serviced dwelling environments to the
poorest income groups in a manner more in keeping with their priorities.
How Well Has Dandora Done?
To date Dandora has provided 1,000 dwelling environments, but not at
minimal financial costs. Attempts to achieve savings by encouraging
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self-help construction of dwellings around mass-produced core units has
failed to produce housing which is more affordable than the vast majority
of conventional units built by the Nairobi City Council prior to 1971
(refer to Figure 3.1). The equitable expenditure of government funds
has been compromised to the extent that the low-income groups have been
excluded from the project, regardless of whether their exclusion has
been voluntary or involuntary.
Dandora's record of cost recovery to date suggests that the project
is replicable. However, replicability alone will not ensure that future
projects will benefit the urban poor. It must be accompanied by
affordability if the effective demand for low-income plots is to be met.
The limited range of plot sizes and services as well as restrictive
allocation criteria precluded the testing of the applicability of sites
and services to all income groups, hence its efficacy as an integrator
of social classes is still questionable. However, the relative abun-
dance of middle- and upper-income housing available in Nairobi suggests
that it will be several years before the better-off residents of Nairobi
will need to seek accommodation in those parts of the city traditionally
occupied by the urban poor, that is, those areas east of the city
center (refer to Figure 1.1). This has not prevented the middle classes
from taking a financial interest in the project: not as shelter for
themselves but as income-earning assets. The demand for plot ownership
by the well-to-do has been met with a willingness to supply these
plots by low-income allottees. The net result of these illegal market
sales has been the one-time redistribution of income in favor of the
original plot owners. The emergent pattern of plot ownership and utili-
zation does not reflect increasing social integration. It is too early
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to judge whether Dandora has had the opposite effect: creaming off the
richer strata of the "target" population, thus severing their economic
and social links with their poorer compatriots.
It remains for future projects to test the adaptability of the
strategy to meet different kinds and levels of services demanded by the
participant population. Similarly, the strategy's adaptability to
changing resource markets has yet to be examined.
The project sponsor's control over the quality of the dwellings built
has had a two-edged effect. On the one hand, it has improved the image
of sites and services as an approach to housing in the eyes of some of
Kenya's policy makers by contributing to the project's rapid rate of
consolidation. On the other hand, sponsor control has undoubtedly
frustrated the efforts of some of the members of the intended "target
income" group by denying them the consumer sovereignty which was to
permit them to house themselves as they saw fit, in a spirit of self-
reliance. If self-reliance can be measured by the quantity of self-help
labor in the project, it is small indeed, though admittedly for reasons
not entirely due to the project design.
The experimental nature of Dandora makes it hard to say whether
sites and services are administratively simpler than conventional public
housing projects. Undoubtedly the enforcement of all the plot develop-
ment regulations promulgated by the Nairobi City Council did little to
achieve administrative simplicity. Standard house designs contributed
the most to minimizing the number of bureaucratic approvals required to
build a house but not below the level required for the City's highly
standardized public housing projects.
Even the most casual observation of the physical condition of Dandora
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would lead to the conclusion that the quality of the environment is
higher than that of any of Nairobi's squatter settlements. With the
single, temporary exception of refuse collection, all public service
systems were of substantially higher quality than those found in auto-
nomous urban settlements. The single piece of infrastructure which was
not up to full adoptive standards was the secondary road system and
for this reason the City Council refused to take it over for mainten-
ance. To date Dandora has failed to deliver on its promise of community
facilities.
Dandora provides the municipal authorities with a controlled develop-
ment. However, the project's gestation period of seven years precluded
the possibility that it could act as a restraint on the growth of
unplanned squatter settlements elsewhere in the city. For all its
enormity, Dandora's 6,000 plots cater for hardly more than one year's
growth in Nairobi's population. Moreover, because of its location on
one peripheral site it cannot be assumed to satisfy the employment needs
of its residents. This is particularly true since few permanent income
earning opportunities, other than subletting, were built into the
scheme. Dandora will not be selected as a place to live by those
families who favor proximity to jobs over high quality dwelling environ-
ments. In the long run, of course, Dandora will be within the built up
area of Nairobi and only time will tell what jobs might be created by
then. It must be remembered, however, that by the year 2000 Dandora's
100,000 residents will be competing against three million other Nairobi
residents for those jobs.
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Implications for the National Sites and Services Program
What does the Dandora experience suggest about the probable regional
impacts of Kenya's national sites and services program? Recall that
the program allocates projects to existing urban centers to meet the
needs of existing urban residents.
Allocation criteria schemes suggest no desire on the part of
Government to induce additional rural-urban migration. Rather they
serve notice that the cost of an individual's migration to an urban
center must include a waiting period of at least six months before
becoming eligible for the net benefits offered by a site and service
scheme. The extension of this period to two years in the case of a
Dandora indicates a weak attempt to divert any possible induced migra-
tion to other, smaller towns, all things being equal. However, there
is little evidence that rural-urban migration is caused by a desire on
the part of a family to improve the quality of its shelter. Moreover,
since the current policy does not include the creation of permanent
employment opportunities, the strategy must be seen as being relatively
neutral with respect to direct population redistribution effects.
However, there is a possibility that short-term employment oppor-
tunities associated with the construction of such schemes may induce
townward migration of those seeking jobs in the construction sector.
Some models of rural-urban migration would predict such an influx to
be proportional to the size of the scheme in question.(1) Since most
projects contain fewer than 400 plots, the policy could be faulted for
inducing a small peak of job seekers entering the local economy. It
is unlikely that these new arrivals would return to the countryside
after the house building has been completed.
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The economic benefits accruing to a region as a result of the stra-
tegy will largely be in proportion to the capital investment already in
place in the region since project sizes are roughly a function of the
sizes of their host urban center. It is not anticipated, therefore,
that the program will significantly alter the inter-regional disparities
in wealth or income at either the aggregate or individual level. This
is likely to be all the more true since, as already mentioned, there is
no explicit permanent employment component to the policy. It is quite
possible, however, that the observed trend of plot ownership passing
into the hands of the middle class could accentuate existing intra-
regional inequities in personal wealth and income. The concentration
of plot ownership in the hands of the well-to-do occurs either by
fraudulent allocation in the first place or by unauthorized sale after
the initial allocation by the government.
Where the transfer of ownership occurs by voluntary sale this
suggets an important lesson to learn from Dandora: the difficulty
in identifying a "target" income group willing and able to engage in
the incremental development of urban homes. The notion of "target"
implies an ability to isolate the group from the rest of society. It
ignores the real and important social and economic linkages which tie
the low-income population with their better-off compatriots. Identifying
a participant population is more than drawing a line on an income distri-
bution curve.
Finally, given the bureaucratic inertia engendered by attempts to
relax building standards in the interests of lower costs, it is to be
expected that the progress in implementing the planned program will not
be rapid. Delays, coupled with escalating construction costs, explain
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why the national target of 72,000 plots for the plan period has been
consistently reduced every financial year since 1974, In a system of
budgetary incrementalism such as exists in Kenya the financial alloca-
tion for one year is heavily dependent on the actual expenditure
incurred on the same item during the preceding year. Where delays
reduce expenditure in one year, the following year's allocation is
reduced proportionately, thereby lowering the number of units to be
built that year. The lowered total number of plots further reduces
potential expenditure and so, on it goes. As of May 1977, one year
before the end of the current plan period, it was estimated that fewer
than 7,900 plots would be prepared by June 30, 1978.(2) As a consequence
the full impact of the program as currently designed will only reveal
itself over a period of decades, not years. The reduced scale of the
program coupled with the renewed trend for demolition of squatter
dwellings by the Nairobi City Council suggests that the national
program will not add significantly to the stock of low-income housing
in the country.
Income Redistribution Effects
The scattered evidence of plot sales in Dandora suggests that the
scheme is having an unanticipated effect on the distribution of income
and income earning assets within the city (refer to Figure 6.4). From
a policy perspective this effect is of considerable importance for two
reasons. Firstly, it is reflective of the revealed preference among
the original allottees for additional income over homeownership under
the conditions offered at Dandora. Secondly, it is very largely
unavoidable since there exist no administrative or incentive systems
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that, at sensible costs, can eliminate the clandestine transfer of
plots. Sensible costs would be those lower than the sale price of plots.
While there are not a lot of data on the phenomenon, it seems reasonable
to draw the following conclusions. In a situation characterized by
severe shortage of approved low-income housing, the short run benefits
to the vendor who values the cash more than the shelter can be signi-
ficant. It thus becomes important to ensure that original allottees do
not have incomes or wealth which exceed the maximum limits specified by
the allocation criteria. Correspondingly, the need for minimum income
limits becomes less important. However, in a situation such as
Nairobi's, characterized by a growing shortage of approved low-income
housing, the long run benefits would appear to be in favor of the buyer
who sublets rooms on the plots. His investment income will rise as
rents increase as a function of the growing housing shortage. The
City's renewed commitment to the indiscriminate demolition of squatter
shanties reduces the possibilities for the vendor to find the kind of
shelter he prefers. At the same time, it increases the potential
income which can be earned from a serviced plot, thus favoring the buyer.
Moreover, inasmuch as buyers are likely to be from the landed middle-
class, such land transfers will lead to increased concentration of
urban land ownership.
We inevitably encounter a grey area wherein we find low-income
allottees who continue to own and perhaps even occupy their plots
but who also develop them for subletting. They, the intended benefici-
aries of Dandora, reap the rewards of both home ownership and additional
income, albeit the stream of income is made up of small payments
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extended over time. As yet it is impossible to say how large this
group is in Dandora.
It seems reasonable to assume that the propensity to sell a plot
would increase with decreasing priority placed on homeownership. Since
desire for homeownership appears to vary inversely with income at least
at the lower income range, it would appear that housing projects which
provide affordable homeownership to those earning less than Ksh 300
per month would be particularly susceptib'e to clandestine plot sales.
This has implications for recommendations which have as their objective
the lowering of prices in sites and service schemes. It is to these
recommendations we now turn.
Implications for Future Project Design
In a study of sites and services schemes carried out in Tanzania in
1975, Robert Merrill made the following cogent remark about the sub-
market best served by the strategy:
"Sites and services are not intended to serve the very lowest
income groups but rather the stably employed poor whose highest
priority is no longer a job but a decent place to build a house."(3)
It is not at all clear that Dandora has served even the stably employed
poor. Certainly this group of people, making up the lower middle
income quintile, cannot afford to own a plot in Dandora without sub-
stantial outside financial assistance. Even renting a room in the
project is beyond their means (refer to Figure 5.1). An important
question to ask is Can the sites and services strategy be modified to
bring future schemes within the range of that fraction of the lower
middle-income group of Kenya's urban population who desire homeownership?
Successful modifications to the sites and services strategy as
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exemplified by Dandora would require reductions of 50 to 90% in the
prices observed at Dandora. How might such price reductions be achieved?
As outlined in Chapter 6, changes in emphasis in project design require
trading off one desirable objective for another. It is thus difficult
to provide a definitive answer to the question. However, the following
suggestions must form the basis for achieving lower prices.
First, it is necessary to extend the range of available services
to include those at the low end of the scale. In particular it is
necessary to offer means of water supply and sewage disposal which do
not require connections to individual plots. This implies a greater
proportion of plots without relatively expensive core units. If
water-borne sanitation is required, such services could be provided
at locations central to clusters of plots but where each allottee
retains control over his facility. A broader range of standards also
requires permitting and encouraging the construction of dwellings out of
mud-and-wattle, timber, stabilized soil block and other materials which
have lower capital costs than dressed stone or concrete block. City
Council approval of house plans should be waived where dwellings are
built out of traditional materials and where no construction loans are
used. It is possible to build roads and footpaths to less than "fully-
adoptive" standards but with provision for later upgrading.
Second, it is necessary to introduce more progressive repayment
systems. This can be done by permitting smaller down payments, longer
repayment periods, longer intervals between payments, and graduated
increments in monthly payments which match the increases or decreases
in an allottee's income over time. The added measure of progressivity
must be more than large enough to offset the effect of increasing long-
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term loans for building materials and labor. The small element of
self-help labor observed in Dandora requires that in future, construc-
tion loans be increased to include a sum for hired labor. The alloca-
tion of plots to groups would also facilitate repayment by permitting
families with temporary cash shortages to be covered by families with
temporary cash surpluses. Group allocations might also reduce the
propensity for low-income plots to be sold on the open market on the
assumption that it would take a unanimous decision by the group to
sell.
Thirdly, attempts should be made to generate greater cross-subsidies
within projects as well as between projects. This can be done through
the market sale of residential and commercial plots, and demonstration
houses, and also through marking up monthly plot costs to middle-income
allottees. Creation of cross-subsidies in this manner does not require
that a mix of income groups actually occupy a site. Rather it induces
an economic mix of plot ownership. Thus market sales can create cross-
subsidies but they do not necessarily contribute to socio-economic
integration of the urban population. Cross-subsidies generated by
profit margins incorporated in monthly amortization payments for some
plots would seem to have greater potential for creating economic mix
within a project. However, this is true only to the extent that the
project meets other requirements deemed necessary by the better-off
residents: high environmental standards, availability of community
facilities, etc. Similarly, higher monthly payments by the better-off
plot owner could induce him to seek more tenants with resultant
overcrowding.
To the extent that the urban poor define their priority need to be
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increased income and to the extent that they will be allocated serviced
plots, sites and services will continue, willy nilly, to provide one
source for this income, through the market sale of plots. If reduced
prices mean that plots can be allocated to poorer people, this may lead
to increased plot transfers with commensurate income redistribution
effects. It also implies an increase in the concentration of urban
land ownership amongst the rich.
The question of what to do to increase the low-income groups' wil-
lingness to pay for serviced sites is filled with serious normative
implications. The answer lies in addressing the needs of the urban
poor which take priority over housing, and not in attempts to re-order
these priorities by legislation or indoctrination. For example, attempts
to regulate the re-sale of plots by restrictive covenants in the lease
agreements are tantamount to legislating higher priority for housing
in the family's list of felt needs. Such attempts are doomed to failure.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the desire for improved housing occurred
ninth in a list of felt needs elicited from Nairobi's squatters. Items
which took precedence over improved housing included food, school fees,
clothes, money to buy land in rural areas, money to send to relatives,
and money to expand a business. The multi-sectoral approach to community
development attempted in Dandora was designed to cater for many of
these non-housing needs through the creation of employment in a setting
which also provided the necessary social services and appropriate
dwelling environments. The project has demonstrated, however, that
methods for providing employment and non-housing services are not as
well developed as those for supplying dwellings. Furthermore, Dandora
has shown once again that the country's housing delivery system has a
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bias in favor of producing new units for the middle-income, even when
it has a clear mandate to cater for the needs of the low-income.
Significantly, Nairobi's squatters attached greater priority to
obtaining money to expand their existing shelter than they did to
obtaining a better house or room to live in. More significantly still,
they placed the need to maintain the current standard of shelter at the
existing location as a priority second only to the need for food. This
suggests that strategies which consolidate or marginally improve
existing dwelling environments would meet with better acceptance by the
very low-income than providing new accommodations at higher standards.
The indicated strategy is therefore one of settlement upgrading.
The improvement of existing low-income residential areas is under-
taken through the provision of infrastructure services and financial,
technical, and community development assistance of the kind supplied by
sites and services schemes. Where upgrading is done to serve the
existing residents it offers a number of benefits over the servicing
of new sites, besides making a better match with user priorities.
Superimposing a network of public services on an existing unser-
viced settlement can confer benefits to all residents, even those who
do not improve their dwellings. Upgrading effectively captures the
investments already made in the dwelling environment, including the
efforts of self-help labor. This implies that the sponsor's investment
in the project can be lower than is required for the servicing of new
sites where self-help labor represents no more than 8-10% of the total
equity. The most important advantage that upgrading has over new plots
is the possibility of adopting lower and hence more affordable stan-
dards of services. The configuration of many existing settlements may
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limit the provision of water and sanitation to central locations.
Upgrading requires the tacit approval of existing dwellings which are of
a standard which would be politically unacceptable under other more
conventional programs. For all these reasons programs to improve
existing settlements come closer to serving the needs of the very
low-income. However, upgrading does have its disadvantages. As with
sites and services, there can be a tendency for the middle-income groups
to displace the original population, as land values rise as a result of
the improvements. Upgrading does not, of its own, relieve the problem
of unemployment. It does not create net additions to the housing stock,
nor does it have much potential for cost recovery much less for genera-
ting cross-subsidies. Problems with regulating land tenure and public
acquisition of land can create delays in implementation no less serious
than those incurred in the servicing of new sites.
Clearly what is suggested is that strategies for upgrading and
providing new sites mus-t be combined in ways which compensate for their
respective weaknesses. In particular, the surplus funds generated by
the market sale and leasing of new plots should be used to finance the
improvement of existing sites. That is, future programs should require
lower-middle-income plots to cross-subsidize the upgrading of low-income
plots. Where upgrading requires the demolition of housing to make way
for public roads and services, the displaced families should be offered
accommodation on a newly serviced site, preferably withing the existing
settlement. From a programming point of view, it is recommended that
wherever there exists a shortage of government finance for housing,
upgrading should take priority over newly serviced sites and the latter
should only be included to the extent that they provide cross-subsidies
153
and accommodation for those displaced from upgraded areas. This
recommendation is made in the interest of providing the most bene-
fits to the poorest of the urban poor.
Preliminary indications are that future urbanization projects in
Kenya are broadening the range of options to include upgrading on an
experimental basis. The "second generation" IBRD project scheduled
for implementation in 1978 is intended to upgrade one low-income
dwelling for every six serviced sites. Some 3,000 plots are to be
developed for market sale and the proceeds are to be used to finance
the preparation of additional plots or to provide a cross-subsidy to
low-income plots. Moreover, greater attention is to be paid to the
provision of non-housing services such as education, health care,
recreation, nutrition, family planning and employment generation than
was the case in Dandora. These project components reflect the well-
placed and continuing concern for meeting the felt needs of Kenya's
low-income. However, the failure of similar and less ambitious
attempts at Dandora underscores the importance of developing both the
political will and the institutional framework required to respond
to the needs of the urban poor on their own terms.
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2. Van Straaten, J.J., Sites and Services in Kenya, Nairobi, National
Housing Corporation, May 1977, p.3.
3. Merrill, Robert, Housing Finance Advisory Services Final Report,
Tanzania, URT/69/009, July 1975, p.11.
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Appendix 1: Summary Chronology of Dandora Community
Development Project, 1970-1977
Project Definition
Nov 1970 NCC establishes the Nairobi Urban Study Group to prepare a
metropolitan growth strategy within three years
Mar 1971 IBRD agrees to review NUS and NCC agrees to prepare a
pre-feasibility study for urbanization project for possible
IBRD financing
Feb 1972 GOK resolves to ban sites and services projects from Kenya's
urban centers. NCC finishes draft interim urbanization
project proposal which is approved by IBRD
Mar 1972 NCC submits interim project proposal to GOK for approval
and onward transmission to IBRD
Sep 1972 GOK approves interim project proposal and makes official
submission to the IBRD
Nov 1972 IBRD recommends preparation of full feasibility study for
urbanization project
Project Preparation
Nov 1972 Town Clerk forms the Housing Task Force (HTF) to prepare
project proposal for submission to IBRD by June 1973
Jan 1973 Technical Director takes up six month post to lead project
preparation effort
Mar 1973 HTF selects site at Dandora
Jun 1973 Technical Director leaves post with work incomplete
Jul 1973 GOK abolishes Graduated Personal Tax, eliminating important
source of finance for NCC
Oct 1973 HTF discusses Draft Project Report with IBRD who want to see
more details on standards and procedures
Mar 1974 IBRD threatens to cancel project if NCC does not resolve all
the outstanding issues by June 1974
May 1974 NCC finishes all-out effort to document missing pieces of
project proposal
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Project Appraisal
Jun 1974 IBRD appraisal mission arrives in Nairobi to review physical
aspects of the project
Oct 1974 IBRD mission returns to review the financial and procedural
aspects of the project
Jan 1975 IBRD Loans Committee approves final appraisal report in
Washington, D.C. NCC approves content of project, structural
plans for Phase I, and designates site as a Grade II By-law
zone
Feb 1975 IBRD, GOK, and NCC commence negotiations
Apr 1975 Final Appraisal report No.607a-KE published by IBRD
May 1975 Loan and Credit agreements signed by all parties
Project Implementation
May 1975 NCC establishes new department to implement project: Dandora
Project Department (DPD)
Jun 1975 DPD finalizes tender documents for Phase I consisting of
1,000 plots
Jul 1975 Commissioner of Lands hands over Phase I site to DPD
Oct 1975 Contractor begins preparation of Phase I plots and associated
infrastructure. DPD begins design of Phases II and III with
assistance of design consultants
Jan 1976 Construction of Phase I core units begun by sub-contractor
using prefabricated concrete panel system
Mar 1976 DPD approves design of plot application forms and begins
soliciting plot applicants
May 1976 Medical Officer of Health cricizes design standards of Phase
I already under construction
Jun 1976 Applications closed at end of month; nearly 21,000 applica-
tions sold, 16,000 returned. Preliminary design of Phase
III completed by consultants
Aug 1976 Verification of applications completed with 9,308 retained as
eligible entries. Mayor of Nairobi resigns after elections
cancelled by MLG
Sep 1976 Computerized balloting system selects 6,000 allottees from
amongst the eligible applicants
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Oct 1976 DPD sends letters of offer to all allottees; all but 55
accept. Draft tender documents for Phase II sent to IBRD
for approval
Nov 1976 Preparation of Phase I completed, ready for occupancy by
allottees. Town Clerk resigns amid growing public displeasure
at low level of services rendered by NCC
Project Occupation (Phase I)
Nov 1976 Allottees take possession of plots but cannot start building
approved dwellings because no house designs have been
approved by DPD; allottees commence building temporary
shelters
Dec 1976 Medical Officer of Health criticizes design standards of
Phases II and III which are similar to those in Phase I
Jan 1977 NCC "accepts" details plans of Phase I because already built,
approves standard house designs, refuse to approve Phase II,
III plans, particularly the sewer system. Town Clerk orders
demolition of all temporary shelters by March 31, 1977
Apr 1977 Compromise reached on standards for Phases II and III within
NCC. Consultants permitted to resume work
Jun 1977 MLG orders central government probe of NCC to inspect admini-
strative and financial management
Oct 1977 NCC begins series of demolitions of squatter settlements in
Nairobi contrary to Dandora Project agreement
Dec 1977 Allottees occupy one half of plots, construction started on
three quarters, finished on one third. Tenders for Phase II
advertised by DPD. Image of Dandora exceeds expectations
Mar 1978 Rash of senior officers resign from DPD, including Project
Manager and his Deputy
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Appendix 3: Glossary of Abbreviations
DCDPC Dandora Community Development Project Committee
DPD Dandora Project Department
GOK Government of Kenya
GPT Graduated Personal Tax
HTF Housing Task Force
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA International Development Agency
IMF International Monetary Fund
IRR Internal Rate of Return
MES Monitoring and Evaluation Study
MLG Ministry of Local Government
NCC Nairobi City Council
NHC National Housing Corporation
NUSG Nairobi Urban Study Group
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